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Soviet Russia and the Nature of Society¹

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To draw useful conclusions from what is conventionally called "the Russian experiment" one must probe beneath casual resemblances or contrasts with other societies. In Russia incomes have become more unequal, and in the United States more equal. Paradoxically, this convergence stems in part from their mutual hostility. Many Americans too readily accept the assumption that the sole essential fact about Russia is the conflict of their way of life with ours. We may profit from pondering the quite opposite over-simplification of the French novelist, Mauriac:

It is not what separates the Soviet Union and the United States that should frighten [us], but on the contrary that which they have in common. Their ideological oppositions are perhaps less to be feared by [us] than their agreement regarding the scale of human values. These two technocracies which think of themselves as adversaries are dragging humanity in the same direction of 'de-humanization'.

The concern in this discussion is to learn what Soviet life reveals about the general nature of industrial society. Evidence will be reviewed on five interrelated topics: 1. the nature of economic processes; 2. the nature of political processes; 3. the bases of social stratification; 4. the

¹Delivered as a lecture in the senior-graduate inter-departmental program "Perspectives in Contemporary Life" at the University of Kentucky 1951 summer school. The program was directed by Professor Carl B. Cone of the history department; it was initiated by Dr. Martin M. White, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, from whom interested readers may obtain lists of all the general lectures or other information. General lectures occupied one hour each day, followed by an hour with small discussion groups. Then each student spent two hours daily on a course of his selection, totaling three courses in as many successive two and one-half week periods. The courses included in the program were: Twentieth Century Europe (Enno Kraehe); Influence of the Newspaper (William Moore); Contemporary Art (Clifford Amary); Political Parties (Jasper Shannon); World Politics (Amary Vandenbosch); Social Psychology (James Calvin); World Religions (Jesse DeBoer); Social Classes (C. Arnold Anderson).

The analysis in this paper is of course the responsibility of the author alone.

role of the rational element in society; 5. the nature of human nature.²

1. *Economic Processes in an Industrial Society*

A. Economic versus Political Controls

The swallowing up of other social institutions by the state, so threatening a movement in all modern societies, has reached a climax in Soviet Russia. The supporters of the regime defend this monopoly as an essential stage that will lead to eventual discarding of the state when a classless society shall have produced spontaneous harmony—though one hears less and less of this justification as time passes. State control of economic life in the U.S.S.R. went through several early stages each of which is of considerable interest, but here we will limit ourselves to the more mature period since the NEP.

Supervision of economic life by central political agencies (coordinated by the central planning office) reached a new peak in the first five-year plans. As successive enterprises came into production, however, there were revealed innumerable shortcomings in the capacity of centralized agencies to provide efficient management. Gradually separate industries and individual firms were granted wider scope for operating decisions under the still firm hand of the central directorates. In non-economic areas of life, as the arts, totalitarian control has met with fewer checks from hard facts.

It has become progressively more evident, and acknowledged by Soviet leaders, that economic processes are distinct from, even though not independent of, political processes. It has been found that decisions in production must be based on criteria different from those used when power is the focal interest. Even the concepts of orthodox 19th century economics are finding use again, however concealed in logomachy.

²The indulgence of Russian experts is requested for the omission of innumerable qualifications in order to adapt the discussion to the audience. The writer is engaged on a study of social selection in Soviet higher education, for which a grant has been made by the University of Kentucky Research Committee; many courtesies have been extended by the Russian Research Center of Harvard University. The following works have been of great value to the author. These studies, perhaps best read in the order listed, will provide an excellent survey of Soviet society. The significance of the Soviet program is graphically posed in the editorial article, "The Soviet Worker," in the *Atlantic Monthly* for July, 1952.

Inkeles, Alex—"Social Stratification and Mobility in the Soviet Union: 1940-50", *Amer. Soc. Rev.* 15:465, 1950; Bauer, Raymond—"The New Man in Soviet Psychology", 1952; Fainsod, M.—"Controls and Tensions in the Soviet System", *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 44:266, 1950; Timasheff, N. S.—"The Great Retreat", 1946; Moore, Barrington, Jr.—"Soviet Politics: the Dilemma of Power", 1950; Berman, Harold J.—"The Challenge of Soviet Law", 1951; Inkeles, Alex—"Public Opinion in Soviet Russia", 1950; Towster, Julian—"Political Power in the U.S.S.R., 1917-47", 1948; Gsovski, V.—"Soviet Civil Law", Vol. I, 1948; Bergson, A.—"Structure of Soviet Wages", 1944; Bienstock, G. et al—"Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture", 1944; Baikov, A.—"Development of the Soviet Economic System", 1946; Schwartz, H.—"Russia's Soviet Economy", 1950.

Profit is not just the portion of production wrested from toilers by capitalist exploiters, nor even mere excess of income over expenses. Profits reflect skill or luck in combining resources—and Russian managers' salaries are being graduated to profits.

Interest, or the rate of return on investment, likewise has become an operative concept in allocating resources. For even Soviet planners must consider the return from investment in, say, barges versus locomotives when laying out the capital account for a coming year. Attempts to avoid the concept of interest led only to waste and confusion. (Interest has even been allowed once more to perform its second function, of providing a reward for lending saved funds). A concept of rent has also proven essential. The government has had to take cognizance of the fact that some collective farms earn more because they have better land, transportation, or markets. In cities, it has been found prudent to use certain locations for retail shops rather than for workers' gardens.

The abortive moneyless system of the earliest days has not been revived. Indeed all Soviet planning is geared to an accounting system deriving from the relations between individual establishments and the market. Without money, prices, and markets—and without appreciable freedom for management and consumers in buying and selling—the Soviet economy would again spiral down into chaos.

This growing autonomy of economic forces is becoming formalized in law. Decisions by managers or directors of economic agencies are being upheld by courts against arbitrary party officials who are not in a position to know the facts. Production enterprises are not merely political bureaus, but agencies acting in the light of distinctively economic situations.

B. Incentives

That labor discipline is a prime industrial necessity, and its achievement a major cultural revolution, was discovered by the communists as it had been by 18th century Lancashire factory owners and 19th century South Carolina proprietors. In the earliest years many Soviet leaders believed that replacement of capitalism by socialist folkways would induce men to be content with rewards adjusted to their needs. Reluctantly at first and then dogmatically it was announced that payments must be proportionate to contributions, not needs. Russia today, accordingly, possesses the most complex array of rewards and penalties in human history.

The optimism of the early years was not wholly misplaced. The masses did display enthusiastic devotion to public projects and made heroic sacrifices. But the Party learned that most workers most of the time responded more reliably to direct, tangible inducements. As the pace of work was accelerated by industrialization and war, incentives came to be used with greater deftness and enthusiasm was less relied upon. Appeals to the "dignity of labor" motivated innumerable Rus-

sians but not persistently unless living conditions improved or workers were paid more than shirkers. The whole piece-work system devised by the hated capitalists was adopted and extended. Wage differences widened. The privileges of superior producers drew steadily away from the meager rewards to mediocre workers. Meanwhile, profit-sharing by workers and managers stimulated efforts in each factory, and savings were encouraged by payment of interest on bank deposits.

We think of social security as a right of unfortunate citizens, and the Russian leaders trumpeted this ideal for many years. But their desperate urge to raise productivity and the formidable task of disciplining workers have led them to turn social security into an incentive system. Thus health insurance payments are graded by the length of time a man has been on his present job as well by his state of health. Absence from work, except on dire emergency, may be deemed a criminal offense. Strikers receive no unemployment pay, for there are no strikes. Old age pensions are too small to encourage premature retirement. Most significantly, the positive economic incentives of the social security program have been undergirded by coercive and drafted labor of various kinds.

C. Property as an Organizing Principle

That labeling property 'public' does not persuade citizens they have a meaningful share in the national domain was one of the most sorrowful lessons the Communists learned. Graft, waste, favoritism, and shoddy goods plague Russian life. To be sure, the people are proud of their parks and schools, their dams and generators. But the Party learned that you keep production up to standard by making particular individuals responsible for particular pieces of property. A general ownership of property is less significant than the power to dispose of specific pieces of property for this use as against that use, by this person instead of by that person. Penalties for theft are higher in Russia than in America, and those for theft of state property exceed those for purloining private goods.

The Soviet government has legitimized more and more varied sorts of private property in consumer goods (and in certain claims on income from producer goods) as devices to make men work harder. At first only the most personal possessions such as clothing were private; gradually savings accounts, insurance policies, houses and gardens, even royalties and patents have been included.

Ownership or control of property both reflects and establishes social status in Russia as elsewhere. Higher officials control more property—much as an American general receives a car with driver and orderlies—including effective rights to control other people's lives. And in Russia too, those with more property in their names or under their management (like the executives of American corporations) display

appropriate tokens of status: maids for their wives or better schooling for their children.

Producer goods are supposed in Soviet doctrine to belong to the people as a whole. Obviously this nominal mass ownership is not conclusive. For the essence of property ownership is control over its use and over disposal of the income earned by its use. Neither of these powers is exercised by the Russian populace. Rather, these controls are divided and intertwined through the complex power hierarchy; in particular they are divided between the managers of factories and the central control agencies. In neither a Russian factory nor an American corporation does the manager own the business. Managers in both cases do, however, have control of property in that they determine within certain limits the ways in which productive agents will be combined, the rate at which they will be used, the number of men employed, and sometimes wage rates—all without consulting higher authority in day to day decisions. In some respects the Russian managers enjoy the greater power over their "employees," for they are not subject to strikes nor, except in extreme cases, to court action. They need not heed stockholders' wishes. On the other hand, they operate under orders set down by the central government more minutely than by our political agencies, and they can suffer more direly for failure.

American stockholders receive profits. In Russia, such "profits", once they pass beyond the discretion of the managers, are at the command of the central planners and are reinvested without consulting the wishes of the so-called owners of Soviet property. Russian workers who supposedly "own" their factories may not stay home from work to tend their gardens or sleep off a drunk.

The increasing use of property as a pivot for the functioning of Russian society runs through all this discussion. Ownership or control over property is an incentive. At the same time decentralization of such control has become increasingly important—both regionally, and in the roles of managers of individual establishments. To be sure, nothing like our scope for private rights exists or is in prospect in Russia. But as with us, control as well as "ownership" is vital. A Russian manager cannot close his factory in a labor dispute; but he can use the police to discipline or blacklist workers who challenge his authority. And he is gradually gaining more opportunity to enter court in defense of his judgment against that of some higher official. Property, sometimes under new labels, is being restored as a coordinating instrument in economic affairs.

D. Persistence of Conflicts of Interest

Many schools of thought share with Marxism the conviction that societal conflicts stem mainly from struggles for control of the means of production. The Marxists asserted that when no individual could

control the lives of others for private gain and when society's property should be owned collectively, social struggles would disappear. Soviet history falls short of providing support for this contention.

In the "workers' state" labor unions have become devices for disciplining workers, retaining only modest power to protect them. Wages are set not by collective bargaining bolstered by strikes, but by central planners and plant managers unilaterally. The stretchout is common. Ratebusters are public heroes. Managers have often had control of housing privileges and food rations of their workers. Much of this tight control reflects the hard necessity of training peasants to operate machines. But the Party argues that since workers are employed by their own state which is no longer the instrument of capitalists, workers no longer have interests contradictory to those of the directors of production. The stringency of labor discipline would seem to testify to something less than such complete accord.

The most dramatic economic conflict in Russia has been the bitter war between the peasants and the state. This contest is only partly an expression of peasant fondness for antiquated tillage. In larger measure it reflects the determination of industrial workers to raise their levels of living faster than could be effected by free economic transactions. And the Party was determined to industrialize more rapidly than freely saved capital funds would allow. Hence manpower and food have been taken from the peasants at the point of a gun and their ways of life have been revolutionized so that even more might be yielded in the future.

The revival of the courts and of law (discussed below) speaks also of the failure of conflicts to wane with a new regime. In this connection forced labor camps are perhaps less indicative than the continued activities of thieves, swindlers, or irresponsible husbands. Each new extension of private property produces new disputes, as between two householders over a hedge. As Russian society becomes more complex the varieties of disputes multiply and the devices for settling them must keep pace.

II. Political Processes

A. Political Power

We call Russia totalitarian because there is a monopoly of power by a self-chosen group. This Communist Party claims to be the agent best suited to create the historically predestined classless society. To do this, they assert, necessitates monopoly of power to defeat shortsighted counter-revolutionary groups and to convert the masses to an appreciation of the nature of the new society. Public opinion, the Party holds, will not discern the path to this new society unless it is moulded by the Party that has demonstrated its understanding of the situation by the very achievement of power.

Today it is clearer to us than it was thirty years ago that to endow any group with full powers to rule as agents of the general public and

to select their own members is to abandon all restraints on the power of the living persons who serve as those agents. Short of another revolution, there are no enforceable limits to the acts of this Party. Their self-guided view of the situation must prevail. The communists are not mere conspirators, but rather resemble theocrats claiming a monopoly of knowledge of the ways of providence. Russia's constitution has many fine statements of civil rights, but few means of influencing the Party's interpretation of those rights exist.

Societal imperatives have meanwhile been generating some restraints upon unbridled power; these restraints promise to be more protective of individual rights than the words in the constitution. They are arising partly from the desire to legitimize the revolution upon some basis more philosophical than success alone. The boasted success of the regime is not wholly congruent with the volume of terroristic control apparent to all.

Gradually, also, limits to official acts are crystallizing, as witnessed by the growing status of law and courts. Russians are demanding more stability of social relations than can be found in the dogma that the ruling group is not an economic class and therefore reigns in the interests of all the people. From these changing day-to-day decisions there are emerging effective rights of citizens against some types of arbitrary power. A determination to protect some individual interests stems also from the urgency for more adequate incentives to hard work and loyal service.

Westerners are properly cynical about the Communist Party's claim to be serving mankind. We find in Russia proof that men holding absolute power do not wield it gently. Each new exercise of power produces a need for additional weapons to correct the deficiencies of the earlier ones. Absolute power is defended in the name of absolute moral principles, which themselves encourage extension, not restraint, of power.

In a centralized polity, especially when it embraces the economy as well, controls multiply like rabbits. The theory that manipulation of a few key functions suffices to operate a society appears not to stand up to this practical test. Though in economic affairs decentralization has won some headway, the total range of Russian life under control has shrunk little. Industrial control led to control of labor supply, of access to schools and vocations, to censorship of science and arts. There are police to watch the police who watch the police.

The Soviet experiment suggests that freedom in our sense exists only when there are independent and multiple seats of power. There must be strong groups having their source of power free from central control so that such groups can really affect the government. If all commanding positions, all representation, and all access to the elite are guarded by one unified party, there will be no checks upon the tyranny of that dominant group.

B. Public Opinion

Soviet society exemplifies the power of a determined, coherent group—and the weakness of public opinion that has no basis in independent groups. This ruling clique, by maintaining sufficient unity, has elicited untold sacrifices and wielded terrible weapons of coercion without successful challenge. This is not to say that the Russian government acts whimsically in disregard of public sentiment. The Party is guided by an idealistic faith. It must also prevent counter-revolution. And it can bring forth the desired amount of work and cooperation only by heeding public attitudes to the extent required to carry on the practical affairs of the nation.

Hence Soviet rulers study opinions as well as mould them. The Party indoctrinates and at the same time reflects sentiments upward to the rulers, and it permeates every group. Not even social clubs may exist without supervision by the Party. In Russia there are no private interests.

Though we regard Soviet elections as hollow formalities, they are more than rituals. Elections are occasions for the Party to report what it has done and intends to do. By obtaining a gesture of support from the public, that public's bitterness over what it has not received is softened. What the communists call self-criticism goes on all the time, though often minor officials are scapegoats. Letters to editors report on negligent bureaucrats, reflect public sentiments, let off steam. Seldom can one trace a major policy change to public opinion. Yet the leaders heed opinion in adapting policies to circumstances and in choosing where to make concessions.

The preeminence of the Party has support from the millions of Russians who have come up in the world. Those who have gained prosperity and influence are grateful and want to maintain their gains. As occupants of privileged positions many of them also exert a subtle influence upon the regime which tends to dilute the autocracy of the top ranks. New technicians and managers who are lukewarm toward the official philosophy do not on this account challenge the government; but they have come to expect the regime to satisfy their needs. And whatever concession the Party makes opens a small channel for public opinion to exert itself.

Despite the unceasing propaganda poured upon the Russians, aided by their isolation from other societies, political apathy is rampant even within the Party. Often the causes are the same as here: pressures on time and energy, competing interests, hopelessness of being able to exert real influence. Partly, we may surmise, the source lies in the clash between hard conditions of living and the claims on behalf of the new society.

C. Law

Law is being given a place in Russia alongside executive power and

public opinion. Earlier talk of replacing law by economic relations and administrative edicts has died down. The need for stability and dependability in all aspects of life is being recognized. Legal procedures once ridiculed as bourgeois are now proudly hailed as socialistic, a tacit admission they are essential in any complex society. Recognition is being granted to the sense of rightness and legitimacy beyond that deriving solely from a successful revolution.

To stigmatize law as tricks by which an exploiting class dominates its victims is no longer tolerated in Russia. Law is conceived as a set of rules and procedures that assure equity and predictability in human affairs. This new respect for law has fostered a higher status for lawyers and judges. Cases are less often than formerly decided on the basis of a vague "revolutionary justice" or the defense of a workers' society. Precedent, specific statute, and evidence are again honored. Distant as Soviet law may be from our conceptions of "due process", it is immeasurably closer to our conceptions than it was twenty years ago. That it is not closer still may reflect the absence of the basic concepts of Roman Law in Czarist Russia quite as much as more recent communistic doctrine; only slowly do fundamental concepts such as those of Western law root themselves in the soils of other cultures.

III. The Bases of Social Stratification

A. A Complex Society Must Be Highly Differentiated

Lenin was wont to speak casually of the ease with which charwomen could learn to rule. The earliest Soviet officials, though mainly of middle and upper class origin, lived modestly and worked hard. The October Revolution abolished fortunes, and they have not been permitted to revive—though a stranger observing the gradations of power, income, and living standards might not suspect that fact. The emergence of a new and elaborate status system suggests that occupation is a more basic source of status than is wealth. In a complex society there are innumerable functions to be performed, and there must be suitable devices for attracting the right people into the key positions. Skills to perform the more responsible functions are rare, this scarcity extending further down the occupational scale in Russia than in Western nations due to Russia's late industrialization. The Party has had to diversify and augment incentives in order to elicit the kinds of performance deemed essential—phrased by someone as obedience, hard work, and ability.

The dynamics of industrialization in combination with a social revolution that turned society upside down has made political affiliation and economic functions the primary status determinants. Old settlers enjoy little prestige in Russian towns. Race has been played down—perhaps the most singular achievement of the regime. Private wealth has little

place, in contrast to its role in the United States. Brains and education are as essential to a high place in Russian as in American life.

Artists and writers bask in the limelight and receive handsome salaries, if at some risk. Military officers rank high, though definitely subordinated to the Party. Though in Russia as here elementary and secondary teachers are ill paid, scientists and technicians are more esteemed than among us. And so far as earned incomes go, the income distribution in Russia is very like ours.

From the similarities in status structures it may be concluded that insofar as status rests on performance the sources of stratification are to be found in the functional necessities of the society. Status is not mere snobbery or exploitation. Their common industrial character, so unlike the economies of most human societies, has produced progressively more similarities between the status systems in Russia and the United States.

Must "snob class" also emerge from these other distinctions of status? Certainly snobbery is re-emerging in Russia. Nevertheless the Russian dogma of a classless society is not an empty phrase. While the party fosters status distinctions and clothes them in symbols, until recently it talked also of the soon-to-be-realized classless society. (Of late the identification of a classless with a communistic society is beginning to be scouted in official statements.) This paradox is less puzzling when we look at both aspects of status. On the one side are the actual distinctions of roles and their privileges and symbols. On the other side, there is the ease or difficulty in moving from one rank to another.

B. Functions, Privileges, and Symbols of Rank

Russian managers earn more than most of the workers in their plants. Energetic workers are rewarded generously. Generals live better than sergeants. Job and income are reflected in a man's apartment, the rug in his office, the schools his children attend. What a man gets depends on what he does. Few Russians can live without working, though the idle wife is part of the new social landscape.

The Soviet tax system, like others, partly offsets and partly magnifies income differences. Income taxes are small, even on the largest incomes, which widens inequality. A large part of the national budget comes from a heavy sales tax bearing hardest upon the smallest incomes. Probably in both countries the poorest pay more taxes than the middle group, but the most prosperous in Russia are taxed less than here.

One sees some signs that a group is emerging which possesses some financial backlog beyond current income by virtue of savings accounts, royalties, patents, and greater freedom of inheritance. Factory restaurants have been graded by the rank of their patrons, as were stores until recently. The tight housing market hurts good workers less than others, and recent encouragement to private house-building must benefit mainly those with savings.

Occupations are marked off symbolically as well as by income. Some vocations are uniformed. Railway cars are graded, and very important people have private cars. Autos and drivers go with key jobs. These trappings of authority are as nicely graded as in the most stuffy American corporation or old-line federal bureau. What part of such distinctions should be called incentives and what part snobbery is a puzzle.

Ethnic distinctions have been quite unimportant, though the Russians proper have been growing less tolerant of minorities. Few Russians suffer by virtue of different color or race. International distinctions, however, have sharpened; in 1947 all marriages with foreigners were forbidden.

Membership in the Party confers great prestige and it is not easy to join, fewer than a tenth of adults belonging. Party privileges are matched by heavy duties. Most individuals in important positions are party members; this fusion is as much penetration of the party by the elite as the opposite. The mark of the Russian is becoming citizenship more than proletarian class membership, and with this newer emphasis upon nationalism the prestige of the Party, though not the power of the higher echelons of the Party, may be weakening.

C. Factors Favoring High Mobility

Privileges and symbols of prestige do not tell the whole story. Our president has great power and prestige, but he holds office a short time. Are Russian social ranks, then, something more than a game of musical chairs?

Literally millions of peasants' children are today officials, craftsmen, journalists, or military officers. It may well be that opportunities to get ahead in Russia over the last 25 years have been unmatched in history. But much of this social promotion has been incidental to the gigantic transformation of a peasant into an industrial economy—a transformation that could occur more rapidly because there were other industrial nations from which technological knowledge and technicians could be imported. As the number of factory workers multiplied over and over again, the number of foremen and bookkeepers inevitably expanded. This kind of mobility is not necessarily or primarily due to the fact that Russia is a communistic state, but is rather a by-product of industrialization similar to our experience after the Civil War. To relate this mobility to the nature of Russian society one must look beyond the mere numbers of mobile people, important as these opportunities have been to the beneficiaries.

Vertical mobility in Russia was facilitated not only by rapid industrialization but also by the accompanying political revolution that drove hundreds of thousands of the old elite and skilled corps from their positions. The hectic pace of events also wore some people out; many could not adjust to the rapid changes in policies. Sometimes the Party

demotes men to keep others on their toes and to try out new men. The establishment of the regime by revolution lends a conspiratorial character to the ruling clique that fosters mobility. Party fights, fear of treason or sabotage, and the purges sent thousands of key people to further Asia, down the ladder, or to prison or death. Other thousands automatically were promoted.

Soviet policy has been a series of dramatic zig-zags. Apart from the purges, each new policy required the recruiting of new personnel free of old habits and loyalties. And the intense concentration upon economic affairs has narrowed the criteria of merit and fostered a high rate of mobility up and down the social ladder.

A genuine conviction of the reality and rightness of equality of opportunity pervades Russia. Who your father was, your table manners, your grammar have been as unimportant as they were in much of pioneer America. From log cabin to Politbureau has been a vivid dream. And the chances of making the dream come true have been favored by the absence of inherited fortunes and by the liquidation of the old elite. At one time the children of workers and party stalwarts were arbitrarily favored in admission to higher schools.

Enthusiasm for building the new society, quick rewards for outstanding work, the examples of friends who are promoted—such facts motivate untold Russians to take advantage of the objective possibilities of getting ahead. Americans can understand this kind of opportunity, much as they deplore other aspects of Russian existence.

Nor should we overlook the seriousness with which the Soviet government has assumed responsibility for education. Schools are less adequate than their propagandists tell us, but educational opportunities have multiplied. The regime has striven to offer education to all talented and politically reliable individuals irrespective of their personal financial means. Despite great gaps in the system, it has helped the Party to mould engineers and foremen and officials from rude and half-civilized youth.

D. Restrictions on Mobility

Signs are multiplying that mobility in Russia is slowing down. Partly this reflects the accumulation of middle-skill persons so that replacements on higher levels can be made without digging so deeply into the mass. There are also brakes on mobility.

The unsparing discipline of all life has doubtless demoralized many Russians. Obstacles to changing jobs discourage others. Those with relatives in prison may choose not to strive for prominence.

The widening of income differences and other privileges of the superior workers and officials, along with the new praise of family life, are making it more desirable and easier for some families to help their children into preferred schools and positions at others' expense. This

ambition is aided by low income and inheritance taxes and by large cash awards to artists and inventors. A few hundred rubles beyond what other families have to spend on their children can set one's offspring ahead and put one more brick into the wall between classes.

Certain features of the schools neutralize some of the newer opportunities. Graduates of college preparatory courses or city high schools are favored in entering universities. Parents with surplus cash send their children to such schools, which are in any event not available everywhere and are more expensive. Poor schools in rural districts relying upon local financial resources produce other inequalities.

The comparatively recent, and still moderate, security of intellectuals against suspicion and discrimination is being converted into status enhancement. Their children no longer are restricted in college entrance in favor of workers' children. The Party has been enlisting intellectuals and voicing their praises enthusiastically. These favorable omens along with higher incomes, low taxes, savings, and the stronger academic motivation of their children all help to give these "middle class" children tangible advantages and by the same token to cut down chances for mobility among workers' children.

The influence of the trappings of power upon motivation is difficult to assess. (Does the fact that railroad workers wear uniforms as a mark of their importance outweigh the fact that most railroaders wear uniforms indicating a humble place in the organization?) But there is evidence that who one is as well as what one does affects one's status. An inventor's prize, it is reported, is graded to the status of the man. The son of a Party member finds it easier to join. Military academies give preference to sons of officers.

All these factors added together do not make the Russian class system rigid. One may nevertheless conclude that some people are receiving boosts up the ladder, and others finding obstacles in their way, that would not have existed a few years ago. In asking whether status distinctions need be accompanied by snobbery, the Russian evidence suggests that those who enjoy privilege readily agree to cooperate to keep other men down.

From the Russian experience I conclude that the best assurance of a mobile society (short of perpetual revolution) is a dynamic economy combined with a school system freely available to all youth. By the side of these two factors, other ideological elements have little effect.

IV. The Role of the Rational Element in Society

A. A Revolution Dedicated to Reason

Marxists arrogantly claim that theirs is the scientific version of socialism. Compared to fascists they do not ridicule intellectual activity nor flaunt racist nonsense. They advocate education, science, and social

planning—subject to strict rules of orthodoxy. Carrying through the 1917 Revolution, while hardly foreseen or designed, required calculating strategy. The cult of irrationality has not flourished in Russia.

The communists see themselves as the heirs of the Enlightenment, carrying forward the uncompleted reconstruction of society begun in the 18th century. They believe society can be remade, with science, to suit man's true nature. Some years back the appeal of Russia for many intellectuals in other parts of the world lay in the belief that for the first time the Soviets were building a society on reason. Their strong emphasis on social planning was especially alluring to the politically unsophisticated when, during the depression, we appeared to be suffering the last agonies of a chaotic economic system. How satisfying to believe with the communists that man could remake himself and his society in one sweeping reasoned plan! Heightened nationalism, the cold war, and full employment in the United States have in most cases either reversed these attitudes toward Russia or rechanneled them; but a scrutiny of the role of rationality in Russia is not any the less important on that account.

High praise for the potentialities of science marked the earliest pronouncements of the party. Appropriations for research and for schools are large. Planning has been emphatically rationalistic. However, to envisage Russia as a rationally planned society is an oversimplification. A reckoning of the costs of her centralized planning badly needs to be made. The determination to industrialize Russia rapidly tore the country up by the roots; less drastic procedures might have been cheaper—not to mention the costs (discounted in the Soviet value system) of censorship and purges. Having definite goals in mind, or even attaining them, is not the sole criterion of rational action. There are always the questions of how efficiently the job has been done and of other recognized goals sacrificed in the process.

B. Intellectual Life

The pall of dogma hovers over all intellectual life in Russia. Only those certified as true interpreters of the doctrine may speak on public issues. To be scientific means to follow the party line. This dogmatism has given all Soviet life a theological cast and generated innumerable inquisitions and purges. It has cut off the circulation of ideas that might have proved more practicable than many that were ascendant. It has led to dead-end policies from which recovery has been possible only at great cost.

The debasement of language has been one of the greatest losses of this theological approach to questions. Words mean what the Party leaders say they mean. When the Revolution was new, for example, wage differences were capitalist exploitation; when higher production was desperately needed, equality of wages was labeled a capitalist fallacy.

The history of law at one time was bourgeois antiquarianism; today it is respect for the cherished sources of socialist law. Tremendous amounts of time go into figuring out how to say something in a way that will not bring round the secret police.

Accompanying this drenching of affairs with dogma has gone the politicizing of all life, including science and the arts. Good music or literature is what the Party finds serviceable—or what they like. The damnation of contemporary music was at least partly due to Stalin's finding it less tuneful than folk airs. In science there has been the rejection of accepted genetic theory—and of intelligence tests—as inconsistent with a belief in the unlimited power of the man-made environment.

Censorship of all speech and writing has been tightened. Yet science has not been killed. The Russians can still borrow steadily from the outside world. Then too, political phrases are irrelevant in some kinds of work, as mathematics. In part science has survived by imbedding findings in a thick layer of propaganda that can be penetrated only by technical experts. Obviously all this intrusion of the censor into every sphere of work betrays something less than the full allegiance to reason that was promised.

Nor has faith in education been unqualified or its functions unambiguous. One controversy, as to the importance of training good communists or productive workers, was resolved by cutting down the time given to political instruction. Curricula and methods have drifted back toward Czarist practices with renewed stress on discipline, authority of the teacher, strict grading, emphasis upon drill subjects, and making stipends proportionate to grades. While the schools must not teach what is forbidden by the Party, the demand for basic training testifies to the importance of rationality in its own right apart from dogma. On the other hand, this change itself was brought about by edict. The Russians, like us, have had their disputes over liberal arts versus vocational education, and here again the Party eventually concluded that direct vocationalism fostered neglect of basic skills and turned out graduates lacking initiative and originality. Nevertheless, how and where the graduates will use their training continues to be strictly supervised.

A swing back to traditional values has been underway throughout Russian life. Renewed interest in history, idealization of folk arts, rehabilitation of formerly despised heroes of old Russia, idealization of Stalin, more freedom for the churches, and return to old-fashioned school methods are a few examples. We commonly think of rationalism as playing down tradition and custom; today the Soviets are reviving old customs and many "irrationalities," while other elements of the rationalist faith persist, as in production.

The intellectuals nevertheless enjoy much renown. Science is worshiped though the scientist is suspect. Artists are handsomely paid.

Great scientific work continues to be done in certain fields. Professorships in universities are much sought.

C. Social Planning and Rationalism

In view of the emphasis on rational control of social processes, rationalism in the Soviet experiment should perhaps be viewed in terms of the working of an over-all plan. Have the communists gone where they said they would go, and because they carried out well-laid plans? Did the 1917 Revolution create a new kind of society? Or is a counter-revolution dragging Russia back to the road it would have followed had not the Bolsheviks captured power? Certainly much in Russia has not changed for generations: secret police, corrupt bureaucrats, suspicion of foreigners. Some find Russia today more like the nation of 1900 than was the Russia of 1930.

It is possible to project the trends of old Russia, say from 1890 to 1914, and on up to 1950 in such things as schooling, income, or production. Some who do this conclude that the outcome is much what it would have been without the Revolution, and their argument is persuasive. It is difficult to disentangle conditions due to a war economy and forced industrialization apart from communism, from the conditions due to communism and a centralized economy, and these in turn from conditions due to totalitarian government *per se*. Even were these threads separated, once more the evaluation of forced-draft reform calls for a reckoning of costs. What would be Russia's level of living today if resources wasted in hasty experiments or struggles with the peasants had been invested otherwise? Has planning been rational in fact, and who or what agencies have been (or have been regarded as) most rational in practice? What were the potentials and limitations of centralized rational planning?

The critical struggle over rationality has not been in the intellectual sphere but in the more pressing controversies over the autonomy of the industrial manager and the role of law in social life. The Soviets learned, often the hard way, that when directors of production suffered interference from a distant planning office or officious local party underlings, rationality of the most material sort was undermined. The Party leaders have striven, therefore, to protect the independence of managers without surrendering any Party sovereignty. Inherently, this has been a difficult task, and there has been much wavering. Keeping the intellectuals under tight rein was much simpler.

V. *The Nature of Human Nature*

A. The Communist Party's Ambivalent Conception

The Party is of two minds about human nature. There is heavy reliance upon loyalty and enthusiasm and the power of education. But

on the other side there is suspicion, police, and censorship. Praise, honors, symbols and other non-material rewards are balanced by a crude and brutal use of material incentives and harsh punishment. Talk about the duty of each to work for the socialist fatherland alternates with the provision of great luxury for those who excel. One cannot discern any trend toward reliance upon the gentler or subtler of these incentives as the regime matures. Punishments have not become fewer or lighter. And certainly good work is less its own reward than twenty years ago.

The benefits of socialist society are not, it appears, self-evident, else such strenuous efforts to keep the people from learning about the outside world would be superfluous. Revival of traditional ideologies and the symbols of status do not testify to a higher opinion of average Soviet nature on the part of the rulers of the country. Ranks and uniforms are as prominent as in the days of the Czar.

Changes in the field of criminal law are revealing. At one time crime was conceived as the product of economic need. But crime persists, while the need has ostensibly diminished. Re-education was once preferred over punishment. Today punishment is frequent and harsh—and the age of criminal responsibility has been lowered. Guilt was discarded from the vocabulary of the early Soviet jurists as meaningless since man was the product of his environment, and psychiatrists had a central role in the courts. Today psychiatrists are no more esteemed than with us, and criminals are treated as responsible and willfully guilty beings.

B. The Reservoir of Talent in the Masses

Russians under the skin appear to be much like ourselves. Apparently they have been affected by industrialism more than by socialism. Soviet experience supports our own to the effect that the anti-social elements in man have deeper roots than was once suspected and that they resist influences stronger than even so dramatic a change in society as that stemming from the Russian revolution. The predominance of circumstances over ideology as factors in motivation seems to be borne out by Soviet evidence.

But one thing the Russian drama has made clear—which once would have been received with skepticism, though our own experiences during the past generations have pointed up the same conclusion. The mass, the populace, has been revealed as containing seemingly unlimited reserves of human talent. These talents, to be sure, do not bloom spontaneously—and this is a no less important revelation. Apathy is as prominent as aspiration, lacking motivation and opportunity. But no theory of aristocratic monopoly of talent can stand against Russia's success in rebuilding a full scale of human skills after the decimation of the former learned and ruling groups.

C. Human Nature and the Family

Quite possibly the early Soviet family policies have been the feature of Russian life most offensive to outsiders. Communists of Lenin's stature held moderate views but others heralded the end of family ties. They urged family reforms to free individuals, particularly women, from economic domination, and as the means to rear a new generation uncontaminated by class sentiments or interests. The "dehumanization" of which Mauriac wrote was perhaps most fully expressed in this rationalistically slanted concept of human nature.

In their haste to boost production the Russians moved populations hither and yon, often regardless of family ties. Thousands of peasants or other dissenters were impatiently sent into exile or prison labor camps. Youth were encouraged to throw themselves into vast projects and to serve the Party at the cost of affection for parents. Naked power gave sentimentalists short shrift.

Appeals to raw egotism were mingled with enthusiasm for a new society in the efforts to stimulate work, and the latter appeal gave some support to the family even as the former tended to undermine it. While family ties were uprooted with one hand, with the other parents were rewarded for developing a sense of family pride, of possession and accomplishment. While sentiment was ridiculed, yet the most trite of traditions were dressed up in the new language of socialism. Getting ahead of the Joneses came to be good socialist ambition.

The kind of human nature desired by the party, indeed the kind necessary to operate a machine civilization, just did not flourish in the hectic and atomistic life of the rushing days of the first plan. Rampant juvenile delinquency proved communal nurseries to be poor substitutes for parents, who are now held strictly responsible for the conduct of their children. Nor could public opinion be moulded to prefer communal life over family life. Desire for private kitchens and houses alters even five-year plans. On many fronts stability of marriage proved no less essential to socialism than to capitalism. Thus the family came again to the center of the stage as an indispensable agency for integrating a society through the rearing of stable and responsible citizens.

Conclusions

Many scholars have been too eager in the past to assume that "in the nature of things" certain types of society and certain combinations of ideas and social structures were impossible. The "Russian experiment" has dealt many such beliefs a hard blow.

But Soviet events have been no less brutal to utopian idealizations of societal variants. The bulk of this paper bears on conclusions of this second sort. And some light has been thrown upon the strains arising from incompatibilities of ideology and the compulsions of social inter-

action. The Russian evidence suggests certain conclusions; a longer run of historical experience may winnow out some of these as premature or fallacious.

1. A high-level, widely diversified economy requires extensive autonomy of economic processes, free from political controls. Incentives appealing to economic self-interest, and property-income concepts (or their equivalents) are essential in operating such an economy, be it capitalist or communist.

2. Centralized polities are allergic to private groupings of citizens. Yet collective ownership of the means of production gives little assurance of economic harmony.

3. Freedom in our sense necessitates multiple independent seats of power. Rigid centralized control of social interaction fosters secret police and in turn requires semi-religious validation or "theocratic politics." Public opinion that cannot find root in autonomous groups is manipulable within limits very wide in contrast to our society.

4. Extensive social stratification is functionally presupposed by a complex economy. While rapid industrialization and widespread school opportunities foster social mobility, snobbery reasserts itself with social stability even in the face of a strongly propagandized equalitarianism. The next step is stratification (however loose) of opportunities for the rising generation, and so mobility is reduced and snobbery is reinforced.

5. Doctrinaire rationalism invites monopolization of the expressions of reason by an eschatologically oriented group, even jeopardizing the sources of rationality itself. Such doctrinaire rationalism and social planning have an affinity.

6. Doctrinaire control (rationalistic or other) is eroded wherever intellectual activity is functionally important to a society, in part by systematized evasion of censorship. (Debasement of language comes both from enforcing dogma and from its evasion.) But the major challenge to doctrinaire control arises from the hard tasks of practical coordination of a complex economy.

7. The potential abilities of the masses are commonly underrated.

8. Depersonalizing of the socialization of children is limited by its functional inadequacies for the oncoming generation and by the desires of parents to control the development of their children and to secure for them special advantages.

Land, Liberty and Communism¹

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The land question is international news these days. It has been subject to much discussion in our government, and in the U.N. and other international agencies. Recently our representative in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations commented on land reform in a U.N. speech in what may well be taken as our official view in such matters. He said:

There are sound and pressing reasons for the practical consideration by the United Nations of problems of land reform at this time. Three-quarters of the world's entire population, and in many countries, a still higher proportion of the people depend upon land for their livelihood. This dependence upon agriculture for their living means that their hopes for a better living are tied directly to their land problems. Yet as we review the situation prevailing in many parts of the world, we find that systems of land ownership and other institutions that affect the working of the land are formidable barriers in many countries to higher output and to higher standards of living.²

Such things as this don't just happen. There are deep and important reasons back of them. The statesmen of the free world have waked up to the fact that the communists are using promises of land reform as the major sales point in their campaign to win the allegiance of the peasants of the world. For centuries upon centuries the plight of hundreds of millions of peasants has either grown worse, or improved very little. Suddenly the modern miracles of transportation and communications have brought to even the humblest villages in the most remote places of the earth a new sense of the possibilities for improving man's lot. Whether the stirring be an expression of discontent or of hope, it is one of the great facts of our time. Consequently we now find our foreign diplomats worried about the everyday problems of farm production, the amenities of rural life and the justice of the land use systems.

I

As we attempt to understand what's happening to us these days, we find our minds running back over earlier centuries for comparisons and insights that have proved illuminating. These experiences have much to teach us. As we survey the larger scene there are at least three features of our own times which stand out boldly. First, the whole world is in ferment; second, great social, political and industrial revolutions are going on simultaneously; and third, the whole globe is being

¹Revised from remarks before the faculty and students in agriculture, Texas Agricultural and Mechanical College, College Station, Texas, March 10, 1952.

²Isador Lubin, reported in *Land Reform—A World Challenge*, Department of State Publication 4445, February 1952, p. 28.

drawn into the great conflict of ideologies between communism and those sponsored by the free world.

We turn naturally to a review of the revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries. There had been building up for a long time a set of ideas and beliefs that aroused the hopes of humanity. There was the very deep belief that had been nurtured by the Christian church for centuries, that the world had been created out of an infinite goodness and rationality. The great religions had long emphasized the dignity and brotherhood of man. Those great movements which we refer to as the Renaissance and the Reformation swept the western world into new ages of intellectual ferment and hopes for the possibilities of human achievement. As trade developed into industry, the great economic reorganization of society occurred around specialized production and markets which we call the Industrial Revolution. Out of all this vast welter and turmoil we can see now certain major developments: the feudal societies of western Europe were cracked, and in many places were rather completely replaced; individual ownership of farms by the farmers themselves for purposes of productive usefulness came to be widely recognized; and the great national states of western Europe were gradually pieced together.

For our purposes the French Revolution may be taken as representative and as the symbol of these great upheavals. The greatest lasting consequence of the French Revolution upon the life of France was undoubtedly the placing of the farm lands of France into the hands of owning peasants. In fact, the peasants of France so rejoiced in the ownership of their land, that it has been remarked that they have never become much interested in anything else.

Other countries in western and northwestern Europe and the British Isles have each resolved their problems of land ownership in their own ways. Denmark is an example of a country that shifted over quite completely from a land of large feudal estates to a nation of modest-sized farms operated by owning families.

If you ask yourself, where have the Russian communists been able to make their great gains in Europe, the answer obviously is in eastern Europe—approximately in those places where the great tides of reform of the 18th and 19th centuries were held back by the feudal societies which dominated these countries. In these very countries after the First World War there was quite a surge of land reform, wherein many large estates were divided up into small farms. However the movements withered up, leaving dissatisfaction and continued poverty in their wake. Neither the democratic impulses nor the development processes had enough momentum to carry through in this part of Europe. After World War II the Communists managed to get control of these countries, and their agriculture is undergoing collectivization in the Russian pattern. We may be about to see a reconsideration of a policy of the collectiviza-

tion of agriculture in Yugoslavia which has been undertaken under guidance of communistic theories. This is one of the reasons why Yugoslavia is such a significant social laboratory today.

All over the globe there are great stirrings in the agrarian countries with the endless sequence of political revolutions, the formation of new states, and the stirring of the masses as they grope toward more satisfying ways of organizing their lives—in Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and the remaining fragments of feudal Europe. One might well add Africa to the list, for the rumblings of trouble to come are likewise pouring out of that vast continent.

Now it is precisely at these points of unrest and revolution that the issues today are being drawn between the philosophies of totalitarianism and freedom. And it is due to the very structure of these societies that the land tenure and land reform issues have taken on such great significance in the ideological struggles of our time. We shall therefore now turn to a more precise formulation of the "land problem" as it relates to the issues of liberty and communism.

II

If we are to understand the great ideological conflict in which we are engaged, we must set a few ideas off with sharp focus. The root idea of this whole business is *property*. Now property is simply a way of defining one's rights and duties with reference to things. The essence of the idea is this: property has been built into our middle class society as the very basis of liberty. The independent farmer is independent because of the ownership of a farm, or of a very secure lease to a farm. The freedom, the independence of the farmer is really an aspect of his right to use his property.

I should hasten to add that we honor the institution of property as a serviceable rather than an untouchable institution. We have lots of problems in this country over the definitions and use of property; for one thing property is power, and great accumulations of property mean the acquisition of power. We have corporations which are extremely powerful due to their great size; similarly we have labor unions which are very powerful due not so much to the property they own, as the influence they wield in the use of property and in the operation of business firms.

The central point I want to make is that we have accepted property as a great instrument of liberty and justice. This is a product of the revolutions against feudalism in the west: the British Revolution of 1688, the French Revolution, and even our own American Revolution. The Communists see it very differently indeed; in their view, property is the very root of injustice, exploitation and oppression. As one of the early

socialist philosophers of Europe put it: property is robbery. This is quite a difference: it is the difference between night and day.

Actually in our society we have worked out a functioning balance between different kinds of power. We balance economic power against economic power in bargaining between corporations and trade unions; we balance the resistance of consumers against the price policies of selling concerns; we balance political power against economic power through legislation, taxation, regulations, etc. As a matter of fact we have actually developed a kind of economic citizenship in our various industrial and business organizations. We acquire rights as members of unions, or participants in social security or retirement plans. These rights are defined through working rules that also impose certain duties on participants. Consequently these working rules should be seen as impersonal rules which define and protect our liberties in areas where the simpler property rules are not applicable. In short we are citizens in many different dimensions; and through an extremely complex political economy we have managed to keep our economic and political systems serving us well indeed.

Out of all this we come to place tremendous reliance on the "system." I remember a visit in Vienna with a junior cabinet member of the Austrian government who had recently been to this country, in which this point came up very neatly. I asked him the usual "tourist" question regarding his impressions of America, "What impressed you the most?" "The fact," he said, "that the American business men consider *the* government *their* government." He was simply astonished to hear business men talk about "our government" issuing bonds.

The essential point to underline here is that we live in a system of political and economic relationships with such stability that it influences our lives very deeply. We have said that property is a foundation of liberty in our system. In a very deep sense we cherish such working rules as the rules of property because of the support they provide to the development of stable character and personality. Here is also the economic root of the greater independence of women, and of the much smaller role of the family in economic affairs.

It is easy to see how two great contending viewpoints, which differ so fundamentally upon the significance of property, should clash very sharply over the ownership of land. At least it would be easy to see if the issues could be made as clear in actual life as they are in theory. Our viewpoint is really the conservative one; and it is a part of the genius of our system that we derive our working rules out of our own experience. The communist doctrine on the other hand is really a great system of deductions—rules deduced from a few basic theories; but it is a system of thought which has been designed initially as a weapon

for demolishing an economic system which the devotees of the theory considered corrupt, inefficient and unjust.

We and our allies are today engaged in a great defense effort, which is essentially a policy of containment. But what we are really after is some way of bringing out into the open field of competition the contest between the two different philosophies of life and work. It is literally inconceivable to us that a people should deliberately choose servitude over freedom. If you ask a farmer anywhere in the world whether he would like to have a farm of his own he is certain to say yes. He would choose land and liberty.

Here we have a dilemma. Why should a peasant people around the world be attracted to a system of economics and politics which denies the very possibility of the kind of private possession which experience has taught these very farm people to value. As we come to understand this dilemma we shall begin to grasp the nature of the problems before us. It is a fact that a great portion of the farm people of this world live in abject poverty, a poverty made worse by high interest rates, unjust tenure systems, primitive ways of doing things, and often made more unendurable by centuries of humiliation before the upper classes. Such facts can be interpreted variously and used to define the problem very differently, according to the theory which we use in establishing the terms of reference.

III

It will help us better to visualize the issues in land tenure problems and to appraise their significance for the great ideological contest now dividing the world, if we review briefly the kinds of tenure situations which we find in different parts of the world.

We should begin by noting a few aspects of land tenure arrangements here in our own country. Essentially the major premise of our tenure policy is that farm land should be privately owned. More particularly we deeply believe in a philosophy of farm ownership which holds that the farm families who work the land should own it. This was reflected in our land settlement policy which favored owner-operators in granting land from the public domain. We have in recent decades put a great deal of effort into programs of education, credit and assistance which would enable working farm families to acquire their own farms, within the general system of free investment in private property in farm land. Now it is certainly true that we have encountered many major problems in this latter effort—inadequate capital and credit, foreclosures in times of depression, lack of management capacity to meet competition, etc. A corollary problem running through our own tenure history of recent decades is that of improving landlord-tenant relations. Actually a careful study of what kinds of farmers have succeeded in acquiring farms of

their own reveals about three avenues of success in achieving ownership, aside from outright inheritance: (1) being born into and working with a farm family that has a good start in the operation and ownership of land; (2) being an unusually capable farm operator or farming at unusually favorable times; or (3) earning money outside of agriculture and buying into farming under the general privilege of investment.

One would be rash indeed to claim that we have no major land tenure problems remaining in this country. I think no one quite sees his way through the capital and credit problems ahead of us in American agriculture. We have conservation problems which we haven't solved. We have a great horde of people, to be counted in hundreds of thousands, who are migratory farm workers, whose children are not getting the education which meets our minimum standards. Also we should not be surprised in future years to see many more objections raised to the freedom of investment in farm land which nonfarm people now enjoy.

But even if all present and prospective difficulties are admitted, there is no denying the simple fact that our farms and farm people are enormously productive, due in no small part to the tenure systems of this country, by which the farmers enjoy the fruits of their toil and are rewarded for their own efforts.

In many other countries, especially in Europe, we find farm families who own and operate reasonably large farms, that are sufficiently productive to make their families a good living. But we have an enormous number of poor farmers in the world. I would emphasize that these farmers are predominantly poor, largely due to circumstances and not because of poor management practices or their own neglect. At least this is a conclusion which observation and study are gradually forcing upon me. It is hard for us to imagine the narrow margins of risk and experiment that are open to most of the farmers of the world. Millions upon millions are so poor that they face literal starvation should they risk some major change in farming practice that failed.

I recall a visit in lower Austria with one of the most honored and progressive farmers in the area. He farmed about 20 acres of land and had neither tractor nor horse—not even a yoke of oxen. He used his milk cows for draft power. However, some of his heavy work in rush seasons was done through a tractor cooperative; most of his draft work was done by his milk cows. I was extremely interested in his reasons for this. "Well," he said, "I have 17 cows and I find that I can work them as much as two hours a day without reducing their milk production. In this way," he continued, "I have virtually no cost for draft power, except the labor of using my cows." Afterwards, I talked to an American friend who knew this farmer well. He endorsed the practices followed by this Austrian farmer—"With gasoline, tractors and feed so expensive,

I wouldn't know how to improve on what this farmer is doing," was the way he put it. Good economy is not always advanced technology.

A great obstacle which countless millions of farmers face is the fragmentation of their holdings. It is, for example, characteristic of almost one-half of European agriculture that the farms are cut up into scattered fragments or parcels. It is not at all uncommon to find farms of 10 acres which lie scattered about in 40 parcels—and many farms under 25 acres may have as many as 100 scattered pieces of land. There are good reasons for these fragmentations; chief among them has been an attempt on the part of parents, generation after generation, to provide economic opportunities for their children.

I understood this problem of fragmentation much better after I had visited a few villages in northern Greece. Here I saw farmers living in new villages; these villages and the farms have been settled during this century with Greeks repatriated from Turkey. In other words, here was a scattered field system which had been created in our time by dividing up big estates of former Turkish landlords. The people built their houses and barns in the village pattern. Once this decision to live in villages has been made two or three consequences follow readily if one is to divide up the land equitably. To each farmer should go his share of the *good* land and his share of the land which lay near-by. If account is taken of only locality and soil type one gets a minimum of 5 to 10 pieces of land lying about the village in all directions. When one takes these same principles of defining equality and applies them to inheritance generation after generation one can readily see that it is natural that the land should be divided up into such tiny parcels as to create all kinds of land use problems. Stated differently, the absence of an operative market value concept for land requires a quite literal application of the principle of equality.

Even if it were only a matter of convenience of the farm family this fragmentation would be serious, but when the full effect of such fragmentation is assessed the problem presents some first-rate issues of policy. It is clear that a farmer cannot use machines very well on a strip of land so narrow that he cannot even turn a binder around on it. It is just as true that he cannot apply fertilizer mechanically, nor even use a horse-drawn drill. Consequently the quality of farming runs down.

It is easy to imagine the serious impediments which fragmentation has placed in the way of increases in food production in Europe. Somehow ways must be found to produce more food with less labor from the same area; few items are more important in the ability of Europe to build up her economy for her own and our defense. Also, consolidation of holdings can be a very great item in increasing food production in countries like India where the country as a whole lives so perilously close to the margin of starvation. The other side of the same coin is that farm

people are simply doomed to very inefficient use of their labor, and consequently to very low levels of living, until and unless they can piece together fields of greater size. Considerable headway is being made on consolidation programs in Europe and elsewhere, but in the meantime many serious consequences are being suffered.

It is easy to understand how sensible people year after year could find themselves miring down into this morass of fragments as they adjusted their affairs family by family to the births, deaths and marriages which occur. It is just as understandable that the young people on these farms should get restless and resentful in a world so fixed that they could see no way of achieving any really satisfactory way of making a living. The resentment against poverty, for whatever reason, is a source of very great discontent.

Fragmentation of holdings is an obvious and dramatic cause of low productivity and poverty. But such handicaps are really a struggle of man against nature, rather than of man against man. Resentment against the poverty and niggardliness of nature can be blind.

Even more serious resentments flow from those arrangements where there are some identifiable persons who can control or exploit the terms upon which land is used. Throughout the greater part of the world, in Latin America, the Middle East, and in most parts of Asia a feudal system of land holding has persisted down to this day. In some countries rather great efforts are being made to redistribute the land to small holders. This was done in Japan, for example, under the direction of our army of occupation, but the movement had a big start before we arrived.

IV

We may begin consideration of this phase of the problem by reminding ourselves that families are of much greater social, political and economic significance in the old world than they are in this country. This is not to say that family connections and assistance are trivial here. But in Asia, including the Middle East, the cumulative gains or losses of families over centuries are of almost staggering proportions. Lands and fortunes have been built up and kept up through attention to business matters, political favors and careful marriages. Generally speaking few are wealthy and the great bulk of the people are miserably poor. The net effect of all this is of course something quite dreadful. Not only have power and fortune tended to accrue to the same relatively few people, but the very processes of ownership and management have insulated the landlord class and frustrated the incentives for progressive farming.

It is difficult for us with such a strong and active middle class to even imagine the effects over centuries of intense social stratification upon the way daily life is carried on. In a society of status the plain work of

the world is done by rule of thumb, by persons who count for little. The persons of prestige and position may actually know very little about how the daily tasks are performed.

A most eloquent comment upon the current defects in the surviving feudal tenure systems was made recently at a meeting in this country by a delegate from Pakistan. He said:

In my own country, the failure of measures for intensive farming has been only partly due to the conservatism of the cultivator: but mainly it has been the result of the systems of land tenure in the country which have kept the unit of cultivation very small. Further it has . . . created a class of absentee landlords who have no interest in the development of agriculture and a resourceless and oppressed class of tenants, who have neither the incentive nor the opportunity of taking to more scientific methods of farming. Where small holdings are owned by the cultivator himself, his power of capital investment is extremely low, even where he has a desire for it. The result is a colossal waste of manpower and national resources. Apart from the economic waste, there are the political and social repercussions of a system which keeps the major portion of the masses of a country ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-housed and ill-cared for in every way. In a fast changing world such a state of affairs can be fraught with disastrous possibilities.*

Poverty is made inevitable by low productivity. Poverty is made worse by unjust distribution. The struggle of man against nature becomes compounded with the struggle of man against man. Poverty in a class society is readily explained in terms of the class struggle.

These basic conflicts of interest, these class struggles are not readily understood by us, who have never had a class society. But such class struggles are easily interpreted by the Russians. They are even better understood by them than by us and the whole Marxian philosophy of politics and economics is designed to emphasize and interpret the conflicts for their own purposes.

Justice Douglas, in his book *Strange Lands and Friendly People*, relates an incident which illustrates the subtle techniques of persuasion used in Iran by Communist agents from the north. Two agents coming through an Azerbaijan village found a peasant with a large family who pointed out a dilapidated old house as his home.

"Look at the miserable place this man has to live," one agent said to the other. "Haven't we got something better for him? Look at your list."

The other thumbed his book and replied: "Yes, there is the home of the deputy to the Prime Minister in Tehran. That is unassigned."

"Put him down for that," said the first agent.

Turning to the peasant, he said, "When the revolution comes and we take Tehran, that will be your home."

By preying upon the peasant's eternal desire to own land; by promises

*Professor S. M. Akhtar, *The Land Tenure Situation in Pakistan*.

*William O. Douglas, *Strange Lands and Friendly People*, Harper and Bros., New York, 1952, p. 42.

to divide up the estates of big land owners and even medium sized farms; by promises to give the peasants enough land to lift them from their poverty; by such promises the Communists have won some semblance of support in country after country. Now we do not know very much about what goes on behind the iron curtains, but it may be that many of the peasants have more to eat after a Communist revolution on the land than before. This is to be doubted, but it could be so. What is more definitely established is that the peasants are not long content because they lack both that minimum of dignity, incentive, and liberty without which life is scarcely endurable.

V

This then is the problem confronting the free world: shall we sit idly by and watch the Communists capitalize upon rural poverty and the age-old grievances of the peasants, gradually absorbing a larger and larger share of the population of the earth into their totalitarian state, or does the free world have a real answer to the problems of rural poverty and injustice? The preservation of civilization requires that the answer must be in the affirmative; and the lessons of our experiences assure us on this point.

It is not enough to adopt a policy that land is liberty. Liberty, or freedom, has two dimensions, an institutional one of freedom from arbitrary interference and a substantive one of income or productivity. Freedom as an institutional achievement requires the development of legal, legislative and administrative procedures which create security of expectations for individuals within a relatively democratic society. Freedom as a substantive achievement requires a sufficiently large total product so that there is enough to go round when distribution is sensitive to the principles of equality. One of the great, persistent, and even inevitable, issues of policy in a free society is concerned with the subtle interrelationships between these two different dimensions of freedom. In the grand liberal tradition of the West as formulated by John Locke and Adam Smith, liberty as freedom from want is viewed as derived from liberty as freedom from arbitrary interference. This contains an inescapable element of truth. Or even if we grant that freedom from want can only come from the greater use of modern technology, as power of man over physical nature, there still remains the question of whether the incentive, or the spark, for economic progress can be fired without institutional liberty. Technology without freedom is dead; freedom without technology is equality of poverty. The moral is that liberty in the sense that property is liberty, must go hand in hand with freedom from want in the technological sense.

As we study the history of modern man do we not have every reason to believe that free men are stronger than slaves? That is our basic hope

for democracy. Do we not have every reason to believe that persons grow and develop their talents best where they are accorded dignity and respect? Do we not have every reason to believe that the free world has the real keys to increasing productivity and elimination of disease? In fact, is it not a part of our fundamental faith that all problems of this world can somehow be met by careful consideration and honest work? This means in practical terms that ways must be found to put ideas to work not only on the production problems of the world, but also that the social systems of the world must be made sufficiently democratic, sufficiently devoted to the principles of equality and liberty, so that there shall be no great mass of people violently resentful over the inequalities in the system. In the last analysis, the humiliation of being treated as a second class citizen cuts much more deeply than the pangs of hunger.

Land tenure problems are of global significance in our time, precisely because in agrarian societies relation of farm families to land (including how much land) gives the primary dimensions of freedom in both the institutional and the substantive sense. The meaning of this fact for the free world can only be that "land reform" must go hand in hand with technological improvements, if the allegiance of the peasant peoples of the world is to be won and held.

This is admittedly a difficult task, but properly understood it should not be impossible. In the first place the stake of the free world in the continuation of peace and order makes great social problems anywhere which threaten war or revolution the rightful concern of the free international community. Even so any attempts to influence either dimension of freedom in a country by any outside organization, U.N. or other, must be done upon invitation of the host country and upon its primary initiative. Other people may help; they can do no more.

The recognition of such programs as those designed for the improvement of agricultural technology and land tenure, as problems of international democratic procedure, brings us face to face with the deepest meanings of democracy and leadership in a democracy. At this level, Professor T. V. Smith's dictum seems most appropriate, that in the final analysis the only leadership acceptable in a democracy is intellectual leadership. At least it seems quite clear that the promises of improved situations in a country are to be the main inducements for the undertaking of basic improvements and reforms in any country. Both the exploration of the potentialities of improvements and the feasible way of proceeding are the functions of inquiry and intellectual leadership.

But whether the query regards the potentialities of technological improvement or of institutional modification the task is one which requires international intellectual cooperation. This is one of the great

challenges before the faculty and students of our colleges and universities, particularly the Land Grant colleges.

The United States experience in bi-lateral foreign aid programs demonstrates conclusively that technicians must also understand the economic processes and social organization of a country before they can give advice of much value in policy and programming.

In problems directly concerned with policies for social organization or economic activity, the adjustments needed are so intimately a part of the fabric of society that an adviser must be an objective and modest intellectual. This means that in dealing internationally with such problems as land reform, we are forced to rely heavily upon advice and education. It is this great fact which places such a heavy moral responsibility upon the social scientists in American colleges and universities to become expertly informed about the problems, cultures and prospects of the less developed countries around the world. If, however, modern science intelligently used does hold the potentialities for increasing material production which we believe, and if margins for adjustment can be created so that a greater abundance is redistributed, and if freedom is as productive as our experience demonstrates, we do have great resources to work with.

Even so the task of assisting a country to really improve its economy would be impossible were it not for the fact that in every society there are sensitive spirits who are moved by the problems of their people and who are willing to face personal risks and hardships to do the right and noble thing. In every free country there are some who put public service above private gain. In every free country there are some who are eager to learn of ways to do things that will help their country's progress. In every free country there are leaders grappling courageously with such difficult problems as land reform. And in every country there are many young people willing and anxious to undertake bold service for their own country. These people are usually more courageous and bold than their own governments: it is in the nature of things that this should be so. It is to these people especially that the international hand of scholarship needs to be extended. Such people are the greatest resource of any underdeveloped country. To develop this resource is peculiarly the responsibility of educational institutions in Europe and America.

The threat of totalitarianism which hangs over the world can be replaced by the promise of freedom only by putting ideas to work which honor the dignity and increase the productivity of man. It is the task of social scientists to develop and shape the ideas which are relevant to the great problems of our time. The land problem is among the greatest, and the free world finds it chosen as a battleground.

Illegal Socialist Parties and Their Organization

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With the advent of Fascism the Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe were confronted with the problem of salvaging what they could of their organizations and membership. The task at the outset was not a hopeless one for the Social Democratic movement had enjoyed considerable mass support amongst the industrial workers and had long dominated the trade union organizations in Western Europe, particularly in Germany and Austria. Moreover optimism was sustained by the belief of many of the Social Democratic leaders in the eventual collapse of Fascism (the last stage of Capitalism) and the ultimate triumph of the proletariat under socialist leadership. If then the ultimate strategic problem was by definition soluble in favor of socialism the immediate task was the devising of tactics for the maintenance of the Social Democratic organizations and the development of leadership which would be able to assume the direction of the masses when the economic and political conditions were ripe for a revolutionary uprising. The program involved two aspects, the maintenance of the Social Democratic organization inside the Fascist lands and the establishment of "committees in exile" in neutral countries.

While there was little disagreement among the Social Democrats on the need for a suitable tactical program to deal with the situation there was considerable confusion in their minds as to the exact form this program should take. Solutions ran the gamut from the extreme right wing of the movement, represented by the defeatists and conciliators, to the far left as exemplified by the Communists. Studies were made of the early history of the Socialist movement and lessons deduced from the techniques employed by the Social Democrats during the period of the Bismarckian suppression in Germany and the illegal operations of the Socialist parties during the Tsarist regime in Russia.¹ The development of satisfactory tactics was in addition, complicated from the outset not only by differences in theoretical approach but by the existence on one side of the Social Democratic Parties in exile, composed largely of emigre leaders and on the other of a developing underground leadership which remained behind

¹ In addition to Bauer's work discussed later, see: Georg Decker: *Revolte und Revolution Der Weg zur Freiheit* (Verlagsanstalt, "Graphia," Karlsbad, 1934) and Julius Deutch: *Putsch oder Revolution? Randbemerkungen über Strategie und Taktik im Bürgerkrieg* (Verlagsanstalt, "Graphia," Karlsbad, 1934). All works of this type include historical summaries of socialist tactics from Fourier through Lenin and seek to develop a present day tactic. Julius Deutch states: "Zwischen der pazifistischen Illusion auf der einen und der blanquistischen Putschromantik auf der anderen Seite die richtige taktische Methode des proletarischen Befreiungskampfes zu finden, ist die Aufgabe, die unsere Generation gestellt ist." Julius Deutch, op. cit., Pp., 18.

under Fascist rule. The emigres were, for the most part, old trade union and party leaders who had managed to escape from the fascist persecution while the underground leadership was representative of the younger and less well known party members. The problem of liaison between these groups was a difficult one to solve and led to friction between the doctrinaire leadership in exile and the more pragmatically inclined members of the underground. This difference of opinion was, incidentally, to have significant effects upon the reconstruction of social democratic leadership following the collapse of the fascist power after World War II.

Confronted with this lack of unity within the socialist camp, Otto Bauer, the distinguished theoretician of the Austrian Social Democratic Party, endeavored in 1938 to clarify the problem and to lay down the tactics which an "orthodox" socialist party should follow when confronted with the necessity of operating under conditions of "illegality." He summarized his views in his work *Die Illegale Partei*, published posthumously in 1939, which although primarily concerned with the situation in Austria under the Schuschnigg regime contains a broad tactical approach capable of a generalized and contemporary application.² Accordingly his formulation has continuing validity today for although the oppression of Fascism has been lifted from the European Social Democratic organizations it has been replaced by the even more ruthless one of the Communist regimes. Since the alternative of a "third force," represented by the social democratic movement, seems among the more promising means of escaping the "either-or" dilemma of capitalism or communism, an analysis of the tactics by which such a third force can best be kept alive under the condition of dictatorship assume significance today.³

The first problem is that of the organization of an underground movement within a country in which the Social Democratic Party has been outlawed—that is has become an "illegal" party.

From the outset it must be recognized, as Bauer points out, that the lessons of past underground movements are no longer fully applicable today.⁴ The experiences of the Social Democracy under Bismarck's Anti-Socialist laws and the situation obtaining during and following the Russian revo-

² Otto Bauer: *Die Illegale Partei*. Paris, Editions: La Lutte Socialiste, 1939. Otto Bauer (1881-1938) was one of the leading theoreticians of the Austrian Social Democratic Party. A prisoner of war of the Russians in 1915 he returned to Austria and was Foreign Minister in the first Socialist Government. Exiled by the Dollfus regime he led the resistance movement to Fascism from headquarters in Czechoslovakia from 1934-38. In March of 1938 he migrated to Paris and died there in June of that year.

³ On the problem of Socialism as a third force, see Leo Moulin, *Socialism of the West* (London, 1948) and Adolf Sturmthal's article, *Democratic Socialism in World Politics*, October, 1950.

⁴ Otto Bauer, *Die Illegale Partei*, Pp., 12.

lutionary period of 1905, are not duplicated in the modern era. Technological progress has placed a preponderance of coercive power in the hands of the government as against the masses. Moreover the police organization of Fascists, and the Communist states, makes similar institutions of Bismarck's Germany and Tsarist Russia seem amateurish. Accordingly the organization of underground movements has become increasingly complicated and dangerous. However, the degree of effective government will vary from country to country and this in turn must be taken into account in determining the specific tactics to be followed in a particular area.

Within these limitations, however, it is possible to trace the broad outline of Social Democratic tactics in regard to illegal organization. An initial advantage of the contemporary illegal movement lies in the fact that considerable numbers of the proletariat now under communist rule in the iron curtain countries were brought up in the traditions of Social Democracy and retain a socialist orientation in regard to economy, political and trade union problems. This was found by Bauer to be true in regard to the proletariat under the fascist dictatorship, and presumably remains valid under the conditions of present day communist totalitarianism. Accordingly an underground movement in Western Europe can rely upon sympathetic mass support for its activities providing that its program can be kept alive. The basic problem then is one of the tactics to be employed in maintaining this program and more importantly, in counteracting the educational and organizational influence of the communists upon the younger generation growing up away from the formal influence of social democratic schools and training centers.

If the experiences of Social Democracy under Fascism are any guide these problems can be met in a variety of ways. First, in the absence of legal organizational possibilities there must be developed underground cells of illegal Cadres composed of trained and reliable party men. These Cadres perform the function of keeping alive the study and formulation of Socialist doctrine in terms of contemporary local problems. But the mere development of such groups divorced from the masses has been demonstrated by Bauer to be a rather futile undertaking. The Cadre without contact with the workers is like a head without a body.⁵ It is therefore the function of the Cadre, in addition to evaluating local problems from the point of view of the Marxian dialectic, to interpret and disseminate this evaluation amongst the mass of workers. In this endeavor the day to day economic interests of the worker must be taken into account. The members of the Cadre should propagandize their fellow workers in favor of socialism by pointing out how the dictatorship is really not working for the betterment of their economic condition and is violating socialist

⁵ Otto Bauer, *op. cit.*, Pp., 119 seq.

doctrine by resorting to the techniques and tactics of fascist totalitarianism. More specifically, considerable hostility to Communist oppression can be induced by specifically pointing out the reduction in living standards following the communist seizure of power, the loss by the individual laborer of any power to influence the economic decisions of the government or the conditions of his own employment through freely chosen trade union representatives, and lastly by stressing the subordination of the national interests of his country to those of Russian imperialism. This latter element was not as susceptible of development under the conditions of Fascist dictatorship as it is now under Communism and represents a new tactic not available to Bauer. The peasant can also be influenced, so far as the Cadre is able to contact him, by stressing the danger of agricultural collectivization inherent in the communist dictatorship. Some of these tactics have already been employed by social democratic groups notably in Soviet occupied Austria. The nationalist appeal has also met with some success in Western Germany, especially with reference to the eastern boundary of Germany. Similar propaganda and tactical moves playing up the nationalistic policies of the USSR have likewise been made by the Titoist party in Yugoslavia as a means of combatting Soviet Communism both at home and on the international front.⁶

The possibility of many members of the illegal Cadres secretly operating with the new legal organizations established under Communist auspices would seem to offer but little hope for fruitful results. Under the conditions of Fascism, as noted by Bauer, cooperation by former trade union and party members in the Fascist labor organization was singularly unsuccessful except for a short period in Italy and Austria.⁷ The basic reason for this failure turns upon the nature of the legal governmental organizations themselves. When the legal organizations are somewhat free, that is when representatives to them are elected more or less freely by the workers and having been elected have even a circumscribed freedom of expression and debate, as was the case in the early days of the Italian and Austrian fascist regimes, then these organizations can be utilized for propaganda and agitation purposes by members of the former Social Democratic party. When, however, the government completely controls these organizations both as to the manner of selection of the officials and as to their function, so that they become a mere facade for government manipulation of the workers (*Herrschaftsmittel*) then they cannot be utilized. In such instances, as the fascist experience demonstrated, the participation of the Social Democrats in state sponsored organizations constitutes a positive

⁶ Seen in this connection Milhoven Djilas: *On New Roads of Socialism* (Belgrade, 1950) and Marshall Tito: *For Independence and Equality* (Belgrade, 1950).

⁷ Otto Bauer, *op. cit.*, Pp., 195 seq. For a discussion of Bauer's point of view see E. K. Bramstedt, *Dictatorship and Political Police*, (London, 1945), Pp., 194 seq.

liability to the illegal party's program and revolutionary activity. This arises from the fact that the workers, seeing their former representatives "collaborating" with the government come to the opinion either that they have been betrayed by their old leaders, or that the former leadership now considers the new government to be acceptable and the possibility of revolution no longer feasible. In either case this results in the growth among the proletarian masses of an acquiescence in the new regime or a sense of helplessness before its power. When this occurs the impetus towards resistance and a revolutionary attitude in the masses correspondingly weakens.

On the basis of experience under Fascism, and since it is evident that whatever workers' organizations might be allowed by the Communist Dictatorship would be completely dominated and controlled by the government and the Communist party, the value to the Social Democrat of participation in such organizations would seem to be non-existent. This does not, however, preclude the possibility of the deliberate infiltration of a few *agents provocateur* for espionage purposes.

The objective of the Cadre would therefore be best attained, according to Bauer's analysis, by the formulation of cell groups, each member of which would by personal contact with other workers in his trade or industry spread the doctrines of socialism.⁸ In addition a recruiting campaign for new members should be conducted amongst susceptible younger workers, and such possibilities as might appear for the printing and circulation of illegal propaganda should be fully utilized.⁹ The continuity of party organization can thus be maintained and a trained group of leaders developed, capable of leading and educating the working masses.

In order for a Cadre to operate successfully even with the limited program outlined above it must be kept a secret and underground organization.¹⁰ Individual acts of terrorism, as employed by the anarchists under the Tsars are, according to Bauer, to be avoided as being in themselves deviations from Marxism and as too costly in terms of the results achieved. Likewise, the heroic but ultimate futile sacrifice of personnel in open agitation against the police state characteristic of the Communist tactic in Austria and Germany is to be denounced.¹¹ The continuity of the party cannot be maintained if its better leaders end up in concentration camps or before firing squads. The best safeguard for the preservation of the integrity of the Cadre would seem to be that followed by the Social Democratic Party in Germany under Hitler. Here Cadres were established throughout

⁸ Otto Bauer, *op. cit.*, Pp., 119 *seq.*

⁹ Otto Bauer, *op. cit.*, Pp., 130.

¹⁰ Otto Bauer, *op. cit.*, Pp., 112.

¹¹ For comment on Communist Tactic of the "Short Term" see Adolf Sturmthal, *The Tragedy of European Labour*, (London, 1949), Pp., 212 *seq.*

Germany but knowledge of who was a member of any individual cell was limited to the actual members thereof. Not only were cell members ignorant of the membership of Cadres in other cities and sections of the Reich but often of the existence of other cells within their own factory, industry or shop. Thus the arrest of one member of a local cell by the state police imperiled at best the members of his cell but not the entire organization. The practicality of this arrangement was so evident that it was eventually adopted by the Communist Party. In addition the danger of *agents provocateur* in cells was minimized by making it impossible for them to endanger more than the local group which they infiltrated. The comparative success of this tactic in the face of the ever-present GESTAPO would auger well for its reasonable success under the MVD.

The establishment of such a compartmentalized underground secret organization, however, poses the problem of the coordination and direction of its activity. Here again as Bauer notes the experiences of the German Social Democratic Party under Fascism are of value.¹² The German as well as other Social Democratic Parties in exile set up central offices in neutral countries. These central agencies became the coordinating bodies for illegal movements within their homelands. Each Cadre or Cell smuggled out to the central headquarters reports on conditions within its own area as well as requests for information and decisions on strategy and tactics. On the basis of this evaluation the central group arranged to send back to the homeland front reports on the over-all progress of the underground movement as well as advice relating to specific problems. This process served to keep the isolated cells aware of the general over-all status of the illegal movement. In addition the central agency included in its reports and publications an analysis of the international situation and developments in countries outside the homeland thus keeping the underground acquainted with events in the outside world. This type of information serves to keep alive the feeling of internationalism which is an essential characteristic of the socialist movement. The central agency also disseminated to neutral countries information regarding conditions under Fascism thus serving to rally international support to the underground resistance movement, and anti-Fascist cause.¹³

As Bauer pointed out, however, one has to exercise great care in regard to the relationships between the Central Agency and the Underground movement in the homeland. The group in exile must not attempt to control the day to day tactics of the underground workers. At best the central group acts as a clearing house, a developer and adviser on overall strategy and a defender of orthodoxy, but should refrain, unless specifically asked for an opinion, from dictating tactics which can best be devised by the

¹² Otto Bauer, *op. cit.*, Pp., 142.

¹³ Otto Bauer, *op. cit.*, Pp., 126-127.

people on the scene. The older leaders too should avoid if possible the development of a feeling of jealousy *vis à vis* the younger underground leaders and should be content with an advisory role in party matters.

Closely connected with this problem of cooperation, and differentiating the approach of the Social Democrats in general from that of the Communist party in regard to illegal party tactics, is the emphasis placed by Bauer upon the democratic process of arriving at party decisions.¹⁴ Unlike the Communist Party organization with its misleading slogan of "democratic centralism" the Social Democrats stand for a free and unhampered discussion and criticism of party tactics and strategy by the mass membership. The Cadre should give the leadership and theoretical analysis, but the decisions must be worked out in cooperation with the mass opinion through the trusted and responsible representatives of the workers. Since under dictatorships this cannot be done openly by party congresses and trade union meetings other means must be employed. Resort must be made to free discussion and criticism on the level of the party leadership in exile.¹⁵

Within the iron curtain countries critical debate and discussion of local problems within the cells must be encouraged and the masses alerted to the issues involved by means of illegally published and circulated newspapers and pamphlets as well as by personal contact and word of mouth.

In these ways both the continuity of the party and its spirit of democratic cooperation and free criticism are preserved. It is only by retaining this freedom of criticism within the party structure that the party "in its great historical sense" as envisioned by Marx and Engels can be maintained. Without it the party reverts, as has the Communist, to a dictatorship imposed from above.

The party leadership of an illegal movement must also beware of attempted "conciliation from above." By this Bauer means historically the attempt of Bismarck and later of the Clerical Fascism of Austria and the Corporative Fascism of Italy to purchase the support of trade union and party leaders by offering them positions in the new government.¹⁶ Some-

¹⁴Examples of theoretical publications by illegal party groups during the Fascist period are found in the series *Probleme des Sozialismus*, and in the periodical *Zeitschrift für Sozialismus* published by the Social Democratic Party in exile in Karlsbad from the time of the suppression of the party in Germany until the fall of Czechoslovakia. Of interest as an example of the reporting of intelligence information smuggled out of Germany is *Deutschland-Berichte der SSD* published by the party's center in Paris from 1933 to the fall of Paris. This type of publication is continuing today and is supplemented by memoirs of dissident communists and Displaced Persons who have escaped from the Iron Curtain Countries; Fritz Lowenthac's book, *News From Soviet Germany* (London, 1950) being illustrative of the latter.

¹⁵ Otto Bauer, *op. cit.*, Pp., 124 seq.

¹⁶ Otto Bauer, *op. cit.*, Pp., 151 seq.

times men are deluded by these offers into believing that by accepting responsible positions in the new legal organizations the interests of the workers can be advanced. Experience with fascist organizations shows that this is merely a gesture of conciliation without substance of performance. The fascist governments never allowed the influence of these men of the old regime, or the apparent economic concession to the workers which the government was compelled to make, to interfere with any of their ultimate objectives. The same would be true of a communist regime and socialist leaders who entertained any contrary ideas would speedily find themselves liquidated by the secret police.

The significance of an application of Bauer's analysis of conditions under Fascism to the present condition of the Social Democratic party under Communism lies in the fact that it indicates how an illegal movement can be kept in existence and readied for potential activation under conditions of complete governmental suppression. When it is realized that the situation behind the iron curtain today is further complicated by the existence of a government imposed from without and not resulting from internal political developments as was the case with Fascism, the psychological factor favoring the development of illegal movements is increased. Given these conditions it would seem reasonable that the Western Powers might well support organizations of the Social Democratic party in exile and do what they can to further the continuance of the illegal party within the Soviet dominated countries. Here is the nucleus of a movement which is indigenous to the countries concerned and which offers a plan for political and economic reorganization generally acceptable to the people; in short a democratic alternative to totalitarian communism. It should be obvious now that a return to a pre-war capitalist economy is impossible in central and Western Europe. The alternative of moderate democratic socialism is therefore a very real and practical one. The use of the Voice of America, for example, to aid in the dissemination of Social Democratic propaganda, the financial support of the illegal movements and the utilization of their espionage systems could not fail but to pay dividends in the future to the democratic bloc. The potential of Social Democratic illegality for fermenting disorder and dissatisfaction within the Soviet satellites is great. The creation and maintenance of Social Democratic cells capable of rallying the people to the support of a western invasion could be of inestimable value in the event that such an invasion takes place. After all Social Democracy is essentially a western ideology and has been nurtured in the womb of western culture. Its resurgence could do much to turn back the flood of byzantine totalitarianism emanating from the Kremlin which although it pays lip service to the doctrines of Marx and Engels has in reality, as Kautsky so plainly saw, betrayed the socialist cause.

The practicality of illegal party work has demonstrated itself in the

conflict with Fascism. There is no reason why it should not with modifications be equally successful against Communism. In so far as Bauer and other Social Democrats have given us an analysis of the tactics conducive to the maintenance and development of illegal parties their views are deserving of attention.

Nationalism versus Communism in Southeast Asia

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It is a widely accepted proposition that the relationship between Nationalism and Communism in Southeast Asia is one of nationalism versus Communism. Occasionally, the parallelism of both movements, apparent in some countries of the area, has led to a qualification of the proposition through adding "true" to nationalism. It then becomes "true" nationalism *versus* Communism.

Probing the ground, one discovers that consciously or unconsciously nationalism is here identified with national independence and as such viewed as a simple and "natural" movement-for-freedom on the pattern of the American revolution whereas Communism, on the other hand, is seen as a likewise simple, but "unnatural" movement for subservience to Moscow. Of course, if one accepts these premises, nationalism and communism are mutually exclusive.

But are these notions about communism and nationalism sound? The simple identification of Communism with the authoritative concepts of the masters of Marxism-Leninism or with the plans of Moscow is misleading even where the attitudes of local leaders seem to correspond to these concepts or plans.

For the sake of clarification, it is necessary to make two broad distinctions: on the one hand, there is communism as a complex movement made up of ideas, impulses, and sympathies connected with the Russian revolution; on the other hand, Communism as a policy concept for the purpose of domination which derives its "persuasiveness" from the state-power of the Soviet Union. True, both types meet where the national leaders of an indigenous revolutionary movement are subservient to Moscow, but in this case the attitude of the national leaders is only one factor among many which will determine the development of the movement. Only when a country is within the power orbit of Russia are all other factors excluded and the future of the country shaped by Communism as a policy concept.

As a movement Communism has many strands and many, even contradictory, potentialities. Which strands are accepted, which rejected, which forces it will release and how they will react upon the initial stimulus, where a communist movement will end, will depend upon many factors the least important of which certainly will not be the circumstances of the concrete setting. By contrast, Communism as a policy concept is simple, consistent and predictable in its ends, though it may be devious in means. Thus if we use the word Communism to denote the movement it is a rather loose term, while if we use it to denote the

policy of the Soviet Union it is more precise. To make a distinction in this article we will call the movement simply Communism, the policy "international" Communism.¹

As to the character of nationalism this has to be said: We have to be concerned with the emergence of a national consciousness, not with the independence of nations. In the Western world this national consciousness was the result of a long and complex process. Christianity had created a sense of human brotherhood, a highly organized church had conditioned people to a loyalty to a center far removed from one's daily experience, and feudalism with its firm organization of society in terms of feudal superior and inferior had implanted a sense of loyalty and service in mundane terms. When in due time the king overcame the nobles and the Protestant Reformation cut the bonds to Rome, the secular loyalty expanded, the spiritual loyalty contracted, and both met in the person of the king. Only when this had happened did the "ethnographic material" of language and culture, which had been long before in existence, assume a significance of its own in providing the flesh of nationalism. Later on, the rise of liberalism and democracy gave to the national consciousness a rationale, part of which was the concept of national independence. Thus when the American revolution took place, there was no more involved the establishment of psychological conditions for nationalism as such but only the transfer of loyalty from one national community to another one. By having been part of an older nation, the future American had acquired a discipline and an understanding of what a national community meant which otherwise could not be taken for granted. As a wit pointed out, the Americans were a nation because once upon a time they had a common king. We have to be aware that the decisive step in the formation of a nation

¹What the position of China is with regard to the two types of communism is a hotly disputed issue. The author believes that Chinese Communism is the result of the interaction of two things, namely, an indigenous revolutionary situation, and impulses from the Russian revolution. It does not appear that China is or will be a satellite of the Soviet Union, but rather that China, on account of her own strength and revolutionary experience, will attempt to become the leader of the Asiatic revolution. In due time Chinese Communism may come to mean, in relationship to the countries of Asia, two things: impulses and ideas connected with Chinese revolution and a policy concept for China's domination of the border lands in the South. That Russia and China have a common front against the West and that in this alliance the Russians may play the first fiddle does not exclude the possibility that, with regard to other areas of the world, the situation between the two will be reversed; nor does it exclude the possibility that one day China and Russia may part company altogether.

There are indications that the Russians were not too happy over the rise of Mao Tse Tung. Note the attack on Mao in 1949 by the Indian Communist Party, a party which has always been dominated by the Soviets. In this attack (*Communist, Bombay*, June-July 1949, pp. 78-82) Mao is called a Titoist, deviationist, etc.

is the emerging consciousness that there exists a group wider than the family or the clan and that loyalty to this wider group is meaningful. Changes in allegiances are a different matter.

It is the purpose of this paper to analyze the relationship between communism and nationalism in Southeast Asia along the lines indicated above.

Can a discussion of the kind be undertaken in terms of such a broad area?

Southeast Asia is a large region covering Burma, Siam, Malaya, Indochina and Indonesia, countries of different languages and cultures. Yet, in spite of these differences, the factors relevant to our study are common to all. All have been colonial countries.⁸ Foreign domination came to them during their prenational stage when the social organization was still tribal and the economy one of subsistence. Colonialism created identical social and economic structures in all of the area. It established identical mentalities and susceptibilities. It posited identical problems. It is the community of these factors which justifies the treatment of our subject in terms of the whole area.

In dealing with the nationalism in the countries of Southeast Asia we have at first to look at their pre-nationalist stage. Here three main differences from the West impress themselves. Except for Islam, none of the religions of the area have stressed the sense of a larger community, none have had the structural organization which is necessary for the indoctrination of a wider loyalty.⁹ Confucianism is a coldly rational system which leads more to the emphasis of a personal etiquette than to the acceptance of social obligations as such. Where it deals with social relationships, its stress upon the family is unmistakable. Buddhism is concerned with liberation from life. Such an idea (omitting even a heaven where one would meet again which gave to beyond-worldly Christianity its social significance) runs counter to the establishment of community bonds. The Hinayana version goes even to the extreme of making liberation from life a personal matter where no outside assistance is possible. Hinayana has consequently established no hierarchy and has thus foregone any role of community-building. Beyond this, these religions are of very little significance to the masses who still live by a primitive animism which is characteristic of a tribal society. Even the Islam of Malaya and Indonesia is (in contrast to that of Pakistan) superficial only. The second difference from the West is the absence of the integrating factor of feudalism in the development of the countries

⁸Siam has been the only country to remain independent, but its formal independence did not prevent it from assuming all the characteristics of a colonial country.

⁹In name the religion of Malay and Indonesia is Islam, of Burma, Thailand and Cambodia Buddhism of the Hinayana School, in Annam Buddhism of the Mahayana School and Confucianism.

of Southeast Asia. There did not develop a hierarchy of loyalty relationships where, by eliminating the intermediary steps, one could connect the top with the base and have a central government. Tribe and clan remained the real social units. The third difference was that these countries were colonial—and that they had become colonial countries when neither a national consciousness was in existence nor even seeds for such consciousness.

Since the local religions were not of such a quality as to become the basis for a national consciousness and since no native powers-structure had been developed which could become the focus of a new loyalty, some other elements had to be found to serve as the bases of nationalism. What these elements will be and how they will emerge we will see after we have surveyed the social and economic situation in Southeast Asia.

Before the coming of the West the peoples of Southeast Asia lived on subsistence farming within village communities which in most cases owned the land. Disease and tribal warfare kept the population on a level compatible with available food. The elimination of these factors by the colonial administration brought an enormous population growth. (In Indonesia, for instance population rose from 10 million in 1845 to 100 million in 1940). But nothing in the new economic pattern could account for such increased population. On the contrary, the economy which was introduced affected the social and economic position of the natives only adversely. The subsistence economy was transformed into a commercial economy which introduced the incentive of exploitation. In cases where the traditional food crops became commercialized, speculation and profiteering deprived the farmer of his full share. In some cases the farmer was persuaded to switch from food crops to industrial crops, like rubber. Now he was exposed to the fluctuations of the world market whose operation he could neither influence nor even understand. In case of prosperity he had enough money to buy rice for his maintenance, but in case of depression he had less rice than if he had planted it in his plot. While the great planters could protect themselves by cartel agreements,⁴ the farmer was fully exposed to the rigors of the market. Furthermore, the introduction of a money economy found the natives psychologically unprepared. They fell easy prey to the Indian and Chinese trader and moneylender who moved in with the Westerners.⁵ Being in need of cash because of his inexperience in the handling of money or because an adverse crop had caught up with him or because the market for industrial crops was bad, he had to turn to the Chinese or Indian moneylender for loans at exorbitant rates. Se-

⁴For instance, The International Rubber Restriction Agreement of 1934. See on this Karl Pelzer, *The Resource Pattern of South East Asia in South Asia in the World Today*, edited by Phillips Talbot, University of Chicago Press, 1950, pp. 114-115 and the references quoted there.

curity for the loan was his land which sooner or later he lost.⁶ Governmental protection for the farmers, where it existed, proved of little avail.

Not only did the new economy shatter the traditional agrarian economy but, by importing cheap industrial products, the local artisan class in many areas was destroyed; and since there was no industry to absorb them, they increased the pressure on the land.⁷

The industry which was established was not manufacture which contributes to the wealth of the country and is able to absorb people but that of extracting industry which gives a livelihood only to few and is of little significance to the domestic economy.⁸ That actual non-participation of the natives in the economy made accumulation of native capital impossible goes without saying.⁹

In short, the colonial economies were dependent economies geared to benefit the metropolitan countries. The colonial countries did not enjoy a well-rounded economy. Their economy was developed in the direction of the greatest benefit for the imperial powers.

With the particular economic set-up went also a particular social set-up. First there was the social stratification along racial lines. At the bottom were the natives, in the middle the Chinese and Indian traders, at the top the Europeans. Another characteristic of the socio-economic structure was that it left little room for a native intelligentsia. People who operate on a marginal level do not need lawyers or college

⁶There are in Burma (total population 17,000,000) 300,000 Chinese and 1,000,000 Indians; in Siam (Total population 16,000,000) 2,500,000 Chinese; in Indo-China (total population 27,000,000) 450,000 Chinese; in Malaya (total population 5,800,000) 2,600,000 Chinese and 750,000 Indians.

⁷There is a substantial native landlord class only in Siam and Indo-China (Cochin-China).

⁸Available data on India (which had had a similar experience) confirm this. In 1891 three persons out of five gained a living from the soil, in recent years the proportion is three out of four. See Daniel and Alice Thorner, "India and Pakistan," in *Most of the World*, edited by Ralph Linton, Columbia University Press, New York, 1949, p. 584.

⁹In Cochin-China where rubber is produced on large plantations, only 17,000 natives were employed. Cochin-China produces three-fourths of the rubber of Indo-China and Indo-China is the third rubber exporting country in the world. Charles A. Micand, "French Indochina" in the *New World of the Southeast Asia*, by Lenox A. Mills and Associates, University of Minnesota Press, 1949, p. 221.

¹⁰In 1938 the income figures for Indonesia were these: The Europeans representing less than 0.5 per cent of the population accounted for almost 65 per cent of the total income subject to income tax. The foreign Asiatic group, 2 per cent of the population, made almost 25 per cent, while the native population, 97.5 per cent of the population, accounted for only 13 per cent of the assessable income. Quoted from Eric H. Jacoby, *Agrarian Unrest in South East Asia*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1949, p. 63.

professors; besides, the foreign powers used the colonial countries for the export of their surplus brains. Thus the higher administrative posts were reserved to the Europeans. No amount of education, though often obtained at the best metropolitan universities, could bring a native to the top. Mention should also be made of the fact that education provided by the government reached very few people.¹⁰ Not only this, but the disparity in payment for the Europeans and the natives was a source of bitterness.¹¹

What was the reaction of the natives to this situation? For a long time they accepted their fate in a dumb and unthinking manner but it was inevitable that at some time there should be an awakening. The small native intelligentsia became acquainted with Western nationalism. External events helped along. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904 created an Asiatic self-confidence. World War I saw the white nations locked in an internecine struggle which destroyed the awe in which they had been held before. World War II saw the French surrender to Japan in Indo-China and British troops marching back in rags to Singapore whence only shortly before they had filed out in martial splendor.

The impact of colonialism itself created a fertile ground for a new consciousness. Torn loose from their familiar surrounding and exposed to the hazards of a profit economy, the masses were at first bewildered and helpless, but then they discovered fellows in their misery from other parts of their country about which previously they had never heard nor cared. One of the results of colonial administration was that it provided the wider geographical framework for such meeting without, at the same time, being able to instill a sense of loyalty. It was by these circumstances that a vague consciousness of a broader community arose which was positively established by the community of their plight and negatively by the feeling that this plight had been caused by the foreigners. Here was fertile ground for the emergence of a new loyalty; what was still lacking was its *raison d'être*. It was here that the ideas of Lenin and the impulses from the Russian Revolution found a promising ground of operation. That the French Revolution had little significance was due—apart from its different sociological premises—to the fact that its spiritual heritage had been betrayed in the colonial countries; that socialism had had no attraction was the result of its disinterestedness in the

¹⁰In Indochina, for instance, only 2 per cent of the population received a primary education, 1-2 per cent a secondary.

¹¹The budget of Indochina provided 15 million piasters for some 30,000 Annamite employees and functionaries of the government, it provided 40 million for 5,000 French functionaries. The French janitor of the University of Hanoi received 1,404 piasters per month while at the same time a native graduate from the polytechnical school would earn 400 piasters (From Harold R. Isaacs, *No Peace for Asia*, the Macmillan Co., 1947 pp. 143-144.

problems of colonial peoples. During the whole life of the Second International colonial peoples came in for very little attention. It is an unpleasant truth for us, but nevertheless a truth, that it was Lenin and the Bolsheviks who were the first—for whatever reasons—to pay attention to Colonialism and its problems.

In influencing the course of events in Southeast Asia the Soviets had the great advantage of being acceptable to these peoples as mentor. In their eyes, the Soviet Union had not become identified with colonialism; the colonial exploiters were the British, the French and the Dutch. The Soviet Union had the better record in Southeast Asia simply because it had no record at all. (What she may be in the future has little influence on the feelings of the present.)

What impressed the colonial peoples most about the Soviet Union was the emphasis on racial equality. It was this idea of racial equality, espoused by the Russians, which became one of the important factors in developing Asiatic sympathy for Communism. While to us the equality in the Soviet Union appears as an equality of people equally dispossessed of political rights to the Asiatic it does not appear so. He is not concerned with the rights of people in general, but with discrimination. Thus he will not be interested in the fact that an American negro has more rights than a Soviet citizen, but he will be interested in whether the American negro has equal rights with the American white. We have to appreciate this attitude however illogical it may seem to us. Asiatic sensitivity concerns equality, not political freedom.

What the Bolsheviks were able to offer was: (1) a simple explanation of the causes of the plight of the colonial peoples through Lenin's theory of imperialism; (2) the idea that poverty is not inevitable; (3) the concept of a planned economy; (4) political techniques suitable for backward peoples. What was meaningless in the Soviet concept was the proletarian basis for a new order and industrialization as the center of economic planning.

Little has to be said about the stimulating influence of Lenin's theory of imperialism. Here was a clear-cut doctrine which explained in unequivocal terms the reasons why the foreign powers were in Asia and what their presence meant to the colonial peoples. The link which Lenin's theory made between foreign exploitation and domestic exploitation by landlords, etc., was particularly impressive.

That poverty, the most pressing problem of Asia, was not inevitable was bound to stir deeply the imagination of the Asiatics. Somehow it had been implicit in capitalism that nothing could be done if people fell by the wayside. There was never conceded a claim of an individual against society for his economic survival. The emphasis of the Soviets that this claim was the essence of all freedom could easily impress people whose main concern was economic survival and who, by their lack of

education and of a democratic tradition, could have little understanding that there was more to freedom than was told by the Bolsheviks. The idea that poverty is not inevitable has further implications, implications which have to do with the establishment of new loyalties. Once this idea has penetrated the masses no nation can be built upon the acceptance of poverty. If a nation already has a long history, during which bonds of allegiance have been established, and then there arises the challenge of the new idea about the avoidance of poverty, the pre-established bond may for a time withstand the strain of the new thought. But in cases where the emergence of this idea coincides with the rise of nationalism the emphasis upon economic responsibility, not by words only but by deeds as well, becomes a *conditio sine qua non* for the new loyalty.

This economic responsibility can of course be discharged only if the government runs the economy according to a plan. Here we have to admit that economic planning has much to commend itself in Asia. Capitalism presupposes as an incentive higher profits from industrial production than from rent on land. But given the situation in Asia, with its heavy population pressure upon land, investment in land is still the most profitable investment. Furthermore since, if an entrepreneur class arises, it can come only from the land-owning class, it is inevitable that the spirit of this class should enter business. The tendency will be to play it safe. Instead of expanding the market by high production and low profits on the basis of competition, the new entrepreneur will make high profits through agreed control of the existing market. The lack of a functioning democracy would make it impossible to use parliamentary machinery to curb such abuses and make the economy serve the people.

As to Communist political techniques, we have to recognize clearly that although they are hateful to us, they are meaningful to the peoples of Asia. The dogmatism of Communist doctrine has the effect of inspiring faith. It may fulfill the function which religion has accomplished in other places. As such it may create an emotive basis which in the end could be used to support also a myth different from communism. Secondly, the authoritative discipline of Communism is conducive to the forging of a new community. At a primitive state any loyalty involving a new consciousness of man's basic relationships has been the result of the interplay between a myth (which met some needs) and compulsion. Authority created the national state, freedom made it civilized and livable. Let us here not forget that Western man also went through an authoritarian school, in fact two: that of the Catholic church and that of absolutism. To say that the authoritarian stage in history is (ought to be) passed, overlooks the fact that history is relative to a particular society. That we went through a period of parental tutelage does not save our children from having to do the same thing.

What has been the result of these influences from the Soviet Union?

It has been the vitalizing of hitherto slumbering societies. In the first place a consciousness of a mission has been given to the intelligentsia; to the masses a dim awareness that their lot has become important. Secondly, a determination has generally arisen to end colonialism, not only by formal political independence, but by economic independence as well. The imagination of many has been fired by the thought of grandiose economic schemes, of a future of plenty. All these hopes and aspirations have found political expression in a number of communist movements.

Inchoate as are still the ideas of the new society, so are the movements. There are Stalinists and Trotskyists (as in Burma); there are Communists who do not know why they are Communists and what Communism means. In short, what we see is a broad revolutionary process in its initial stage. What this process has done so far is to release energies and open up minds of people so as to make them susceptible to new experiences. It is here that a number of factors, partly unrelated to Communism, may enter the picture and start to play their part in shaping the future development. These factors will be: the economic and social possibilities; the experience potential of the masses; the memory of past oppression; and last but not least the "ethnographic" material.

We have said before that while some elements of Communism are meaningful for the countries of Southeast Asia, some are not. There is no proletarian basis in these countries, no possibility of rapid industrialization. Given the lack of native capital and given the necessity of having to raise the living standard as a prerequisite for getting an efficient labor force, attention will have to center on agriculture. Without industrialization, collectivization is impossible. Land will have to be privately owned. The government will have to be concerned with plans for the improvement of cultivation, for reclamation of land, for resettlement of people from overpopulated areas (much of the overpopulation is due to concentration in some areas, a maldistribution of population) for development of industries relevant to agriculture (as production of fertilizers), for the control and marketing of raw materials. Under these circumstances, these countries will look to the experiences of Communist China rather than to those of Russia. This is bound to weaken the international orientation of Communism in Southeast Asia as far as it exists. By looking to Peking a new focus is introduced. To the dogmatic mind devotion to a cause is difficult if its external manifestations do not appear to be unique. If two centers compete for the attention of the peoples of Southeast Asia they may end up being emotionally attached to none. This development may be facilitated by the fact that the focus which is meaningful in socio-economic terms, China, can make no claims for becoming an integrating center since by her explicit ideology she is only in the bourgeois state of national liberation herself, while the other focus, Russia, although theoretically in a position to claim for

herself the role of a center of the world communist movement, is meaningless to Southeast Asia in social-economic terms. That an official rivalry between Moscow and Peking would mean the end of "internationalism" for Southeast Asia is obvious.

To all this has to be added the state of mind of the masses. We cannot imagine that they can shift their loyalty from clan and village to international Communism of the Moscow or Peking variety. In the case of the intelligentsia, there may be talk about internationalism (liberal nationalism also was born amidst enthusiasm for mankind) but we can not expect those who have fought to oust one group of foreigners to submit to the rule of another group, be they Chinese or Russians. As a reinforcement for the emerging national consciousness the presence of the Indian and Chinese trader will serve well. The memory the masses have of exploitation and dispossession by these traders will not be easily lost. There is bound to arise frictions between the Chinese Communists and the local national leaders on the position of the Chinese trader. Since Communist China, under the concept of the New Democracy, protects the capitalists at home, it will not be able to sacrifice them abroad. Nor will it want to. It will find them useful as a means of exercising an important influence in the countries of Southeast Asia. Finally, in the simmering process of a rising new consciousness, the "ethnographic material" of language, tradition, religion—however rudimentary this material may be—will assume its place in creating a sense of being a distinct community. Summing up, communism will have acted as a vehicle for nationalism; but once nationalism starts to emerge it will become a force of its own.

So far in our analysis we have disregarded two things: what if Moscow or Peking impose their rule upon the countries of Southeast Asia and what would be (or will be, where it has already happened) the effect of Western intervention on behalf of the status quo for nationalism in Southeast Asia? There is no doubt that if Moscow or Peking should dominate Southeast Asia hope for a full nationalism would be gone. The peoples would be permitted some cultural nationalism but that is all. Their socio-economic order would be radically transformed if Russia should be the master; it would be hardly affected at all if the fellow peasant country, China, were to take over. But is it likely that either Moscow or Peking will take over—and if so which will have priority? Obviously, given her geographical proximity and her socio-economic similarity to Southeast Asia, China would have priority. But may we expect Russia to be interested in China's expansion? Or under what circumstances would she be prepared to support China's entry into Southeast Asia? This leads us to our second question, the impact of Western intervention upon nationalism in Southeast Asia. Perhaps

the two questions are interrelated? The civil war in Indochina will give us some clues to these questions.

Initially, the Russians took little interest in the movement of Ho Chi Minh. He was more than independent from Russia; he was abandoned by Russia.¹² The Communist of Indochina had no preponderant position within the coalition making up the Viet Minh. Surely, the disinterestedness of the Soviet Union was not a matter of kindness and good faith; it was a matter of expediency. Indochina did not mean too much to the Soviet Union. At the time it looked as if the French Communists would be able to take over France democratically. Since the Soviets do not value nationalism as such they would have preferred Indochina to stay in a French Union dominated by a proletarian Communist party. Therefore the movement for secession from France was in no way encouraged. It is true that by 1948 the hope for a coup in France by the Communists was gone but something new happened, the victorious rise of the Chinese Communists. Now we may assume that the Soviets had no interest in having Chinese Communism spreading into southeast Asia. Since the Soviet Union is far from the scene, the only possibility to maintain a balance of power between China and Russia was to declare a hands-off policy for both in the social revolution of Southeast Asia. There could be little justification for the Chinese to reject such a policy. But at the moment when the French started to intervene in strength, two things developed: first, the Chinese Communists could no longer be expected to maintain a hands-off policy if foreign "imperialist" troops appeared at her borders; it became a matter of security for China. Secondly, the interests of the Soviet Union became involved since now it was to her advantage to have the Chinese Communists help the Viet Minh in order to tie Western troops down in Asia and create a drain on the French and, through them, on American material. It was the Western intervention which coordinated the policies of Russia and China in Viet Nam. The effect upon the Communism of Indochina is obvious. As the war with the French continues, the Indochinese Communists have to rely more and more on the Chinese and this will open up the way for penetration by the Chinese. Something else is happening. In the Viet Minh coalition the Communists so far have not been preponderant, but they have been the most disciplined party. Since discipline in a war is at a premium it is inevitable that the Communists will emerge in full control of the Viet Minh. The intervention will have done two things: it will have given control of the Viet Minh to the Communists and will have made the Communists of Indochina subservient to those of China. What the development in Indochina teaches is how, under the impact of intervention on behalf of Colonialism, an indigenous revolutionary

¹²See on this, Isaacs, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-175.

movement became radicalized, is being thrown into the arms of "international" Communism (in this case of the China variety), and how a possibility of China's penetration into Southeast Asia is being transformed into a certainty.

A final question has to be raised: Suppose that Communism is permitted to develop nationalism, will it be consumed by nationalism or will the sympathies for internationalism, inherent in Communism, survive as a force? The answer seems to be that this would depend upon whether the new order will be able to provide a minimum degree of general welfare. In support of this thesis the relationship between socialism and nationalism in the West can be cited. In his study on nationalism E. H. Carr makes the following observation: as long as laissez-faire was accepted as the natural order by all, the fact that the workers did not benefit by the material and spiritual offerings of the nation did not induce them to renounce their national loyalty, but at the moment that socialism showed to them the artificiality and injustice of laissez-faire and told them to look to the international proletariat for salvation their bonds to the nation started to loosen.¹³ When under the influence of socialism the laissez-faire state became transformed into the social-service state and the workers got a stake in the state, a new attachment of the worker to the state took place. The nationalism of the masses became even more narrow—in the policy of excluding foreign labor, for instance—than liberal nationalism had been. It is true that socialism continued to profess internationalism, but this was a lip-service as significant as similar professions of the Rotary International.¹⁴ "The socialization of the nation brought about the nationalization of socialism."¹⁵ In looking upon this development we are fully justified in assuming that if under the impact of communism the welfare state will emerge in Southeast Asia we will undoubtedly witness the full nationalization of communism.

In our conclusions we can be brief: nationalism in Southeast Asia cannot be separated from social revolution. Social revolution is the creator and the *raison d'être* of nationalism. Communism is the form of social revolution in Southeast Asia. It is a particular type of communism, a type which will undergo "nationalization" if not opposed by colonialism or its heirs and if not forcibly taken over by China, one which will become fully "nationalized" if able to create the welfare state. The inferences of all this for a Western policy should be obvious: accept the

¹³E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1945). See particularly pp. 18ff.

¹⁴This is, incidently, a beautiful example of the contradictory potentialities of a complex movement, an example which should be a warning to those who like to analyze movements in terms of abstract concepts.

¹⁵Carr, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

social revolution in Southeast Asia and exert, whenever necessary, direct pressure on China to make her abstain from intervention in the area. Yet to expect that, given the domestic political climate, the first suggestion could be acted upon would be more than naive. Melancholically, one has then to conclude that the West will need force and plenty of it, if it wishes to do both things: Preserve the status quo in Southeast Asia and prevent "international" Communism of the China variety from penetrating the area.

Communist China's War on the Family

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Ever since the remote ages of Chinese history, the family has been the outstanding institution of the Chinese nation. Its effects on the economic life, on the social control and the moral education of the Chinese people, and on their government are well known to Western scholars. It has been the strength of the Chinese nation. It was the tie that held the Chinese people together so that despite the occupation of the land by alien races, the Chinese people were able to assimilate the invaders. Until the beginning of the 20th century when Western ideas and Western philosophies entered China, the strength of the Chinese family remained unshaken. Even then, the strength of the family was not severely shaken for Western ideas and Western philosophies did not seek to overthrow the family but merely to modify conditions so that individual rights were considered. Then came the Communist conquest of China, bringing a new philosophy radically different from those of the past. The Chinese Communists marked the traditional family as one of the chief objects for destruction, and the Chinese family is now facing its greatest challenge.

However, before discussing the attempts of the Chinese Communists to destroy the Chinese family, perhaps it would be well to review briefly the position of the Chinese family in the past and its hold on Chinese society.

The source of power of the family goes back to antiquity, but it received its greatest impetus from Confucius and the Confucian school of thought. Confucius emphasized the importance of human relationships and proclaimed that the five most important ones were the relationship between ruler and subject, father and son, elder brother and younger brother, husband and wife, and friend and friend. He emphasized that authority belonged to the first while devotion and obedience was obligatory on the second. This was the rule for all individuals to follow.

Thus the family was a state in miniature, with the patriarchal head of the family the source of all authority, just as the emperor was the patriarchal head of the state and the source of all authority. A code of conduct was gradually built within the family prescribing the proper relationship with one another, so that sons gave unquestioned obedience to fathers, juniors gave proper deference to elders, and wives subjected themselves to the will of the husband.

In government, the family was an important cog of the official machinery. The head of the family was held responsible for each person

in his family. He supervised the moral and political conduct of each member and was held accountable for their conduct. He also performed certain tasks required by the government such as census reports, taxation, and labor service. In many parts of the country, where an entire village of several thousand individuals may be composed of persons with the same surname and all descendants of a remote common ancestor, the family heads and the family elders decided on all things in common at the ancestral temple. This group of elders actually was the government of the village and took orders directly from the District Magistrate.

In religion, the family was the medium through which the rituals of ancestral worship were performed. It was an obligation on each male to continue the family line so that the ancestors might be properly honored. To have no descendant was a grave sin. This has served to keep family solidarity alive but it has also resulted in a number of bad features, among them, the encouragement of polygamy and the subjugation of the individual to the will of the family.

Since marriage was an act necessary for the perpetuation of the family, all arrangements were made by the family elders. The prospective bride and groom had no voice in the matter. Through marriage, a bride became a member of the husband's family and remained in it until death. Divorce was difficult and rarely considered. Widows usually remained faithful to the end. This has brought about the subjugation of the female by the male.

In economic life, the family was usually a unit of production and a unit of consumption. The members usually worked together in the family homestead or in the family store. Sons usually inherited the trade of the father. Property was generally held in common and all members contributed to the family treasury. It was a kind of mutual protective association with members helping each other economically. Also, the elders were assured that they would be properly taken care of in their old age.

All these principles served to build up a loyalty to the family so that the individual in China usually considered his family first. This loyalty to the family not only extended to the immediate family but also in a smaller degree to one's paternal relatives because they all came from a common ancestor and so were considered as being of the same family.

With the beginning of the 20th century, Western education entered China and the youth of China were influenced by Western ideas, especially democracy and individual freedom. They demanded their freedom and often broke away from the family; but the traditional ties still held and it was rare that a young couple would marry without parental approval. Some of them left the ancestral village and went abroad, but they always identified themselves as being from a certain village; births, deaths, and marriages were still reported to the ancestral temple. Be-

sides, it was always a source of comfort to the young people that should help be needed, the family could be relied upon.

When the Chinese Communists seized political control of China in 1949, the Communist leaders realized that their strongest enemy was not the fleeing Nationalists but the Chinese family. They realized that if they were to communize China, they would have to do away with most, if not all, of the traditional institutions and replace them with new institutions patterned after the Russian model. Therefore, they labelled all the traditional institutions as feudalistic and reactionary and marked them for destruction.

The Communist attack on the family has taken many forms. Some of them are direct attacks and some of them indirect. They may be broadly summarized as follows:

First, promulgation of a new marriage law based on the Russian model to remove some of the holds that the traditional family had on the individual.

Second, reorganization of the school system to facilitate the indoctrination of the youth, including revision of text books, establishment of youth organizations and destruction of ancient books.

Third, promotion of public denunciation of relatives to destroy the traditional feelings for relatives and also to do away with the elderly population.

Details concerning these movements have been published in the United States in English and Chinese newspapers, especially, the *New York Times*, *Time*, and the *Chinese Nationalist Daily* of New York and San Francisco. Some details have come from weeklies, monthlies, and other publications published in Hongkong and Formosa, but some have come from Communist China also, usually in the form of personal correspondence from individuals in Red China. These sources of information, on which this study is based, have been carefully compared, so that the facts may be established.

The New Marriage Law

The new marriage law was officially promulgated by the Chinese Communist Central Government at Peiping on May 1, 1950. In the first chapter of the law, these principles were proclaimed: (1) "The arbitrary and compulsory feudal marriage system, which is based on the superiority of man over woman and which ignores the children's interests is abolished." (2) "The new democratic marriage system, which is based on free choice of partners, on monogamy, on equal rights for both sexes, and on protection of the lawful interests of women and children is instituted," and (3) "Polygamy, concubinage, child betrothal, interference with the remarriage of widows and the exaction of money or

gifts in connection with the marriage are prohibited."¹ This leaves no doubt as to the aims of the new law.

Concerning marriage, no interference is to be permitted from any individual. Marriage is to be based upon the complete willingness of the two parties and neither is to use compulsion. As long as the man has reached the age of 20 and the woman 18, no third party can have anything to say about the marriage. Thus at one stroke parental consent is abolished. But while individuals cannot interfere with the marriage, the government can. The new law requires the couple to secure a marriage certificate from the government and a certificate may be denied if the marriage is found incompatible with the provisions of the law.² According to recent reports from Communist China, certificates have been denied on the flimsiest of grounds. For instance, an overseas Chinese returning to his village to marry was denied a certificate because he had resided in a capitalistic and "anti-democratic" country.³ Furthermore the law confers political responsibilities on the couple. "The husband and wife are duty bound to love, respect, assist, and look after each other, to live in harmony, to engage in production, to care for the children and to strive jointly for the welfare of the family and for the building up of a new society."⁴ There is no doubt that the couple is required to comply with the requests of the authorities to do whatever is demanded of them.

If a marriage fails or if either one of the party fails to meet his obligations, the new law makes divorce very easy. If both parties agree, the government will grant a certificate and the couple is divorced. The only requirement is that the official must ascertain if the divorce is desired by both of them and that appropriate measures have been taken for the care of the children and the property. Where only one of the spouses desires a divorce, the case must be referred to a court to attempt a reconciliation. After such an attempt has been made a divorce can be granted by court action. No grounds for divorce are given in the law and the only grounds for denial are pregnancy of the wife or membership by one of the spouses in the revolutionary army.⁵

It should be pointed out that divorce has never been looked upon with favor in Chinese society. A marriage was a union of a hundred

¹The Marriage Law of the Chinese Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, Articles 1 and 2. Published in English in *People's China* of Peiping, June 16, 1950, Vol. I, No. 12.

²*Ibid.*, Articles 3, 4, 5, and 6.

³*Sam Min Morning Paper*, (Chinese language newspaper), Chicago, February 15, 1952.

⁴The Marriage Law, Article 8.

⁵*Ibid.*, Articles 17, 18, and 19.

years and not to be broken by trivial things. Under the Chinese Communists divorce is encouraged and even ordered, especially when the woman is still productive. According to reports from Kwangtung province, young widows have been ordered to remarry and overseas Chinese who left their wives in their native villages while they returned overseas, have received letters from their wives that the Communist authorities have set a deadline for them to return home; otherwise, the wives must divorce them and remarry someone designated by the Communist authorities.⁶

As a result of this campaign, petitions for divorce filed in the courts have increased greatly. According to a statement by Shih Liang, Attorney-General of the Central People's Government, the number of divorce cases filed in the courts of Peiping and 21 other nearby cities increased from 9300 for the four months of January to April 1950 to 17,763 for the next four months.⁷ Also, numerous reports have been printed in the press concerning the forced divorce of concubines, emancipation of child brides, and forced marriage between monks and nuns of the Buddhist order.⁸

The new law also promotes promiscuity. Henceforth, there are to be no more illegitimate children. They are either born in wedlock or out of wedlock, and no person shall be allowed to harm or discriminate against children born out of wedlock. Where the paternity of a child is legally established by the mother, by witnesses, or by other evidence, the father must bear the cost of maintaining and educating such a child until he has reached the age of 18. In fact, parents are required by the law to rear and educate all of their children until they are of age, while the children are only required to look after their parents and assist them. They will no longer be required to maintain and support them in their old age nor to honor them in any way.⁹

Reorganization of the Schools

Concerning the reorganization of the school system and other related activities, the Chinese Communists have done the usual things that accompany any political upheaval in China or in any other country: they have tried to win the youth to the new ideology. The only difference is that the Communists are particularly persistent and thorough.

⁶The *Chinese Journal*, (Chinese language newspaper), New York, February 12, 1952.

⁷*How the Chinese Communists Destroyed the Chinese Family* (pamphlet in Chinese), Kuomintang Central Headquarters, Taipeh, Formosa, 1951.

⁸*Chinese Nationalist Daily*, (Chinese language newspaper), San Francisco, November 17, 1951.

⁹The Marriage Law, Articles 13 and 15.

In the schools, the teachers have been thoroughly screened and indoctrinated in the new ideology. Text books are entirely rewritten to do away with ancient thoughts and replaced with the new ideology. Propaganda against the family is liberally sprinkled throughout the pages of the text books. The reader for the first grade is reported to have a lesson which reads: "I don't love my papa. I don't love my mama. I only love the state. I love Chairman Mao."¹⁰

Students and teachers are required to participate in political activities. Every month there are several campaigns or movements which may include a public demonstration or a parade or distribution of propaganda. It may be a campaign to denounce "American imperialism" or to enforce the new marriage law. It may be a campaign to solicit signers to the Stockholm Peace Petition or to secure volunteers to "liberate Korea." These campaigns all seriously interfere with the school work, but the main purpose is to give the students the impression that they are actively participating in the affairs of the state.¹¹

It was during one of these campaigns that a strong blow was struck at the family indirectly. In June 1950 the Communist authorities ordered all individuals, libraries, schools, collectors, book stores, and all other institutions that possessed certain books that are considered to be reactionary, feudalistic, superstitious, pornographic, or dangerous to public morale, to turn them over to the authorities. These books were then destroyed in great bonfires after huge public demonstrations. Prominent on the list of proscribed books are the classics written by Confucius and other great philosophers of the past. They were all labelled feudalistic and reactionary. In explaining this order, Nieh Jung-tseng, Mayor of Peiping, was reported to have said, "although our tangible reactionary enemies have been largely wiped out, the intangible reactionary thoughts still remain to obstruct the establishment of our revolutionary order; therefore, they must be destroyed."¹² Obviously the Confucian classics are anathema to the Communists for the traditional Chinese family received its greatest support from them.

As for the youth organizations that the Chinese Communists set up, one of the principal purposes is to occupy the attention of young people away from the home. Following the Russian model, a Children's Corps was set up to include all children from the ages of 7 to 14, the Young Pioneers for all children between the ages of 13 to 17, and the New Democracy Youth Corps for all youths from the ages of 15 to 25. Also, all young people over 16 may be received as probationary members of the Chinese Communist Party. Removed from family influence, little sentiment for the home and family remains, and the ties are weakened.

¹⁰*Chinese Nationalist Daily*, San Francisco, November 18, 1951.

¹¹*New York Times*, August 27, 1951.

¹²*The Chinese Press*, (English language newspaper), San Francisco, July 21, 1950.

Furthermore, these organizations all try to indoctrinate the young people in the Communist ideology, and according to many reports from various sources, the Chinese Communists have been quite successful in extending their hold over the young people and in securing their loyalty.¹²

Public Denunciation of Relatives

In another campaign, the Communist authorities called for the public denunciation of relatives for feudalistic and counter-revolutionary activities. The young people were told that the revolution is being obstructed by the older people because it will be impossible to bring the older Chinese to the new way of thought and the new practice of Communism. If these oldsters were permitted to exist, the argument ran, they would block the progress of the revolution; therefore the young people owed it to the state to denounce their relatives. Even the closest relative had to be exterminated for the good of the state. As a result of these urgings the young people entered into the campaign enthusiastically. Those who were most enthusiastic in denouncing their closest relatives were publicly praised and officially recognized for their deeds.¹⁴ Here are two such recent cases:

Yip Kai-sui, daughter of General Yip Siu, former Nationalist Commander in Canton, publicly accused her blood father and demanded that he be tried and executed for his crimes. She was quoted to have said: "Formerly, he was my father. Now, he is my enemy. His hands are stained with the blood of many Chinese people. How many pure, good, young students and professors have been arrested, tortured and murdered by him. He should be shot for his crimes!"¹⁵

Chen Lai-guan, granddaughter of Chen Chu-ting, former Chairman of the Lu-tsun village government, denounced her grandfather as a feudalistic landlord and a counter-revolutionist. She appeared at the trial, acted as one of the chief prosecuting witnesses, and shouted the loudest in demanding that her grandfather be given the supreme penalty for his crimes.¹⁶

It is not a coincidence that these elders who have been denounced by their children or other close relatives were among the most prominent people of the former regime. Many of them were the family elders who determined the destiny of the family and the village. Thus at one stroke the Communists aimed two blows at the family. The family elder was destroyed and the idea of family loyalty was considerably weakened.

In recent months this denunciation campaign has increased in intensity. Many of the elderly people who escaped notice in the past were suddenly

¹²New York Times, August 27, 1951.

¹⁴New York Times, May 11, 1951.

¹⁵New York Times, May 11, 1951.

¹⁶Personal correspondence from Kwangtung, July, 1951.

called upon to account for their so-called misdeeds of several decades ago. A large number of *ex post facto* laws were passed to cover a multitude of crimes. An inadvertent overcharge of interest ten or twenty years ago may result in a charge of usury. The fact that a man handled funds for the ancestral temple fifteen years ago may result in a charge that he misused public funds. Each investigation usually resulted in a decision of guilty with the verdict that restitution be demanded as well as a big fine.

Many of these elders were forced to write to friends or relatives overseas to ask that they send American dollars, Hongkong dollars, or other foreign currencies to them to pay the fine or to make the restitution. Many Chinese residents in the United States have received such letters.¹⁷ But payment did not guarantee future immunity. In many cases, one request for money would soon be followed by a third or a fourth, each asking for a higher amount. The Communists were not interested in restitution. They were interested in exploiting the traditional family ties while they could still take advantage of it. Soon no more remittances came from overseas. The elders were either imprisoned or put in labor battalions where they were forced to do hard labor. In either case death resulted.¹⁸

This war that the Chinese Communists are waging against the Chinese family is still unfinished. In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx and Engels warned against qualms about destroying the traditional family, for only with its complete destruction can the new society be built up. As they are determined to follow the Russian model, there will probably be no relaxation in their war against the Chinese family. According to reports from Communist China, the young people are entering wholeheartedly into the new government and following its edicts. In fact, millions of young persons are participating in the administration and communization of the country. Eighteen or 20-year-olds may be serving as mayors of small towns or commanding units of police or help in cleaning up the reactionaries. Political cadres everywhere are made up of individuals under 25 who frequently have the power of life and death over the inhabitants of the area.¹⁹ The future of such a China is a big question mark. However, the Chinese Communists may have underestimated the strength of the Chinese family. It has survived many attacks on it in the past. Even the Chinese Nationalists had to recognize its strength and utilized the family in many ways during the two decades that they controlled China. The Chinese family will probably also survive the Communist attack.

¹⁷The New York Times, November 14, 1951.

¹⁸The Chinese Journal, March 4, 1952.

¹⁹New York Times, August 27, 1951.

Book Reviews

Edited by H. MALCOLM MACDONALD

Michael Polanyi: *The Logic of Liberty—Reflections and Rejoinders*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951, Pp., 206, \$4.00.)

The separate but closely related essays comprising this slender volume reflect the work of a fertile and amazingly comprehensive mind. To both political and economic theory Professor Polanyi brings fruitful insights based upon his background in natural science, as when he applies his knowledge of mechanics and mathematics to the problem of managing a polycentric system, and also when he applies his understanding of the inescapable acts of faith underlying science to an analysis of the foundations of liberalism.

Essentially the book is concerned with the development of the two themes just alluded to. A vigorous defender of liberty, Polanyi at the same time recognizes serious intellectual difficulties in the way of its defence. For this as for any asserted value, he believes, self-evidence is discredited and rational proof impossible. He is driven, reluctantly, to the conclusion that "science or scholarship can never be more than an affirmation of the things we believe in." Accordingly, we must relearn what positivism has taught us to forget, to "believe with open eyes" in such things as truth, justice, and humanitarianism.

In this reviewer's opinion, Professor Polanyi is guilty of a serious error in apparently refusing to admit any middle ground between absolute proof and arbitrary assertion. The liberal does not have to choose between skepticism and irrational affirmation. It would be an unusual use of the term "rational" to deny its applicability to one's decision to assume the validity of judgments based upon induction or involving memory, although the validity of these processes cannot be proved. It is playing into the hands of the true irrationalists, fascist or Stalinist, to suggest that reason has no role to play in establishing the preferability of certain ethical principles over certain others.

The second theme of the book seeks to demonstrate the literal impossibility of central planning. Quite apart from considerations of human weakness, central direction is vastly inferior to self-coordination. In fact, the former must completely break down as a principle for the determination of economic choices in a complicated society. So-called "planned societies" are such only in name. The argument of this part of the volume is both original and convincing.

Professor Polanyi's discussions are always fresh, stimulating, and suggestive. No one who concerns himself with the topics it covers can afford to miss this volume.

Swarthmore College

J. Roland Pennock

Norman John Powell: *Anatomy of Public Opinion*. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951, Pp., 619, \$5.50.)

Aside from introductory and postscript material Powell's text contains just nine chapters falling into four sections: two chapters on measurement, one on groups and individuals as "instruments", four on mass impression media, two on propaganda. This is the presentation order. Three outstanding characteristics of the book can be immediately noted: it attempts to go beyond the usual textbook clichés on measurement; its treatment of mass media is long and loose; it acknowledges the wealth of periodical and monographic literature far more than any competing handbook.

"Anatomy" in the title is almost an empty figure. Perhaps it reflects the concern of Blumer and others regarding lack of organization in public opinion theory. Quickly, however, it becomes evident that Powell has little theory to organize. No distinction whatsoever is made between mass and public behavior. Propaganda is rendered as "the spreading of ideas or attitudes that influence opinions or behavior or both." An alleged "virtue" of this "formal definition" is that it marks off "a body of subject-matter recognizable, in general, as propaganda and distinct from the contents of biology, political science, or other defined areas." However this strikes political scientists, by making propaganda synonymous with communication the problems of content analysis are neatly evaded. Then whatever the chapter on groups and individuals as "instruments" is about, it fails on the one hand to orient action groups as social movements and on the other to do justice to the fact that persons may be agents and symbols. No shred of Max Weber's thought appears; for that matter the work of American scholars like Abel, Blumer, and Meadows is untouched. Blumer is cited once—for his movies and conduct study!

Powell disclaims the end of writing a primer for pollsters, but his measurement materials raise the question of what and how much is enough. For example, in a six page discussion of scaling he reviews one of Thurstone's devices, Likert's simplification, Guttman's scalograms and Lazarsfeld's latent structures. If personal experience in teaching public opinion to undergraduates without training in statistics or research design means anything, this would to say the least be mystifying.

The summation for the section on mass media starts with a sentence exemplifying Powell's level of incisiveness: "The discussion of the mass communication channels has proceeded within the conceptual framework that takes all power in a democracy as an expression basically of public opinion formed and made palpable in a free environment." Whatever 'power', 'democracy', 'palpable' and 'free' conjure in this context, the assertion regarding the antecedent discussion is clearly debatable.

To conclude with a minor point, Powell seems overly guild conscious.

As newsmagazine *Time* would do, almost invariably he introduces individuals, as he presents "political scientist Arthur Holcombe," "historian Wilhelm Bauer", "sociologist Alex Inkeles", and "psychologist Floyd Allport". Does it matter this much? Isn't it true in the development of public opinion theory and opinion measurement that guild labels have had little intrinsic meaning and less honorific value?

Oklahoma A. and M. College

Paul B. Foreman

Gorman D. Sanderson: *India and British Imperialism*. (New York: Bookman Associates, 1951, Pp., 383, \$4.50.)

This book—by a member of the history department of C.C.N.Y., is divided into nine chapters. The first is an effort to describe India before the incursion of the English; the second deals with the author's concept of the genesis of British imperialism; the remaining chapters give an account of the conquest of India by the English, the nature of their rule, and their ultimate withdrawal.

If I read Dr. Sanderson correctly his argument is this: The seeds of British imperialism are to be found in the very dawn of British history—at least as early as the Anglo-Saxon invasion. The barbaric philosophy of life introduced by the Saxons gave place to the barbaric practices of the original Norman Conquest. The rising merchant classes continued these practices from which stemmed the revolution of the seventeenth century. The government of England dominated by the "unmorally aggressive" commercial and landed classes fostered the "rise of unconscionable vested interests" which "brought in its train materialism's inseparable associate—corruption." The conquest of Ireland was the first imperialistic venture of the English and the practices there used serve as an indication of the nature of future imperialistic episodes such as the conquest of India.

To this reviewer the argument is illogical. If the origin of British imperialism is to be traced to the Saxon invasion, which certainly has no connection with capitalism, why bring capitalism into the picture? Can both aspects of this argument be true at the same time? The notion that imperialism stemmed from capitalism had a wide acceptance in the first quarter of this century. More recent research, however, has indicated that this argument was never valid. Dr. Sanderson nowhere indicates an acquaintance with this literature. Any adequate explanation of the phenomenon of imperialism must be such as to account for imperialistic ventures from the earliest times to the present. Dr. Sanderson's argument falls short.

Long Beach State College

William L. Strauss

Glenn W. Miller: *Problems of Labor*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951, Pp., 560, \$5.00.)

This is a book on labor's problems, treated from the point of view of labor, with comparatively little weight given to the attitude of management or the consumer. Labor is a group of individuals, not a commodity. Management and labor cannot be made to lie down in the same stall together, for there is a basic conflict in their interests, so government intervention is suggested to resolve all difficult problems. The author possesses clear perception and is intellectually honest. For example, he recognizes that the payment of high wages alone will not maintain purchasing power, that production does not necessarily rise from shorter hours, and that the raising of funds by government may discourage economic activity and full employment.

The contents of the book assume that labor is here to stay; that different labor problems exist at different times. In addition to the traditional subjects of wages and hours of work, problems of health relative to industrial and non-industrial accidents and illness; of the care of the aged and the handicapped; and of the employment of minors, women, and minority groups are examined. There is no discussion of housing. Since this is a textbook, wage theory must be surveyed; consequently, there is a lucid criticism of the marginal productivity theory. The author sidesteps the pitfall that traps some writers in the field who in one chapter dismiss the wage fund theory, then in subsequent pages argue that if organized labor gets a high rate, there will be less for unorganized labor. A bargaining theory of wages is advocated: the ultimate wage is determined by (1) the skill of the worker; (2) phase of the business cycle; (3) degree of unionization of workers; (4) geographical location of the work; (5) sex, race, and age of workers; (6) nature of work, whether dangerous or not; (7) and wages within the same industry or community. The text does not deal with labor's relation to the broad economic aspects of price levels, continued inflation, and productivity. The rights of the consumer public are protected in a plan which the author advocates to keep essential industries going in time of labor-management strife. The scheme seems to be sound and workable, worthy of consideration.

The physical presentation of the material is made in a functional approach of three parts; introductory paragraphs precede each part. Chapters are approximately all the same length, with questions at the end. Clear, simple words are used; there is no vague and confusing sentence structure. The print is chosen for easy reading.

The Pennsylvania State College

Franklin H. Cook

Robert Payne: *Red Storm Over Asia*. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1951, Pp., 309, \$5.00.)

This is an indignant country-by-country report of the progress of Communism, and of the weakness and failures of western policies in Asia. Robert Payne writes too many books to achieve a striking new point with each, but his sympathy for the common people of Asia and his considerable knowledge of their ways of living and thinking are always reflected in his books and make them a worthwhile—sometimes almost an emotional—experience.

Payne is on familiar ground here: Asia is an awakening continent, the exploiters and the imperialists are in defeat or retreat, the mass of the people are developing a political consciousness and a potent sense of nationalism, native-born leaders are appearing to replace the foreign rulers, the trend is toward a more diversified and more industrialized economy, and from all sides comes the demand for greater equality and better living. This is the "national-social-political revolution" that is sweeping Asia and, because the west is defaulting in its leadership, sweeping Asia into Russian arms.

To counter this shift, he prescribes an aggressive policy for the western nations, but not a militant one. Containment he condemns as a negative policy in light of the great changes occurring in Asia. What Payne seems to argue is that most of the social and economic aspects of the Communist program are necessary and desirable for Asia although the bureaucratic totalitarianism of *Russian* Communism is to be condemned. These social and economic reforms get to the roots of the Asian people's problems and, most important, those who espouse these reforms are winning the masses to their side. Therefore, the western nations ought to take up vigorously these reforms, ought to throw their support to leaders who support such reforms, ought—even—to force Asian governments to proceed rapidly with such reforms. The problem is the same over all of Asia; the time is short; the area in which to operate is shrinking. Either we develop and assist in a positive (and undoubtedly expensive) program that solves problems and wins mass support, and that demonstrates that the ability to effect basic reforms is not a Russian Communist monopoly, or the Red Storm will inevitably roll over all of the Far East.

The thesis with which many readers may disagree is Payne's contention that Communism in Asia need not have been—and it still may not be too late—an extension of Russian power. He says, "It would have been perfectly possible for America and Great Britain to have led the Asiatic revolt. They failed. The orientation toward the Soviet Union by Asiatic Communist countries is largely a result of their failure . . . the Asiatic countries, unlike the countries behind the iron curtain, are not

under the compelling necessity to obey any masters but themselves. [But] . . . Today America is deprived of real control over the destinies of Asia and can no more "contain" Communism there than it can "contain" Communism in the Soviet Union. All it can do at this late date is to align itself with the social revolution in Asia."

One has a sneaking suspicion that this prescription comes too late; that already Asian Communism and Russian Communism are so closely tied that success for one means the success of the other; that at the least we are forced to military measures to "buy time" to prevent areas from moving completely beyond our influence; that peaceful relations, a "settlement", with the Chinese Communists is not possible. However, short of a full scale war to overthrow Communism in Asia (*if that is possible*)—which our government is making every attempt to avoid—the best defense may be an offense such as that demanded by Payne.

There is a general tendency to become discouraged and overwhelmed by the problems we face in Asia. For this reason alone it helps to find someone who writes with enthusiasm, who thinks there is something that can be done, who still holds out hope for the future in Asia. Grenville Clark once wrote that in our negotiations with the Russians we ought to keep in reserve whole batteries of young diplomats; when one group becomes discouraged, or stale, or tired, or cynical, a fresh team should be rushed in to pick up the ball and keep the talk going. Even if he is overconfident, or not always accurate, perhaps we need more men who seek to stir the public about Asia as Payne tries to do.

Twenty-four pages of very useful biographical notes on Asiatic Communist leaders are appended to the book.

Canberra, Australia

James R. Roach

Clarence H. Patrick: *Alcohol, Culture, and Society*. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1952, Pp., 176. \$3.00.)

This little volume is more an enlarged prohibition tract than a sociological study.

It is true that the author takes as his thesis the idea that alcohol and its use are deeply embedded in cultures around the earth and can be understood properly only when viewed in this light. He brings forward various bits of evidence on the customs involved and on the effects of alcohol on the person and on society. But his study is never incisive and this reader, at least, had the constant feeling that he was being preached to on the evils of drink.

Though he admits that "alcoholic indulgence is too deeply rooted in the customs of human societies to admit of being removed by means of legal processes," he nonetheless outlines a 15-point legal program to ameliorate the problem. The federal government should regulate the manufacture and transportation of alcoholic beverages, but the states

should have a monopoly on their retail sale, with local option as to sorts of sales to be made in each community. Advertising of such drinks should be prohibited; and each bottle should contain a warning such as is used on narcotics. Sale should be by permit only and restricted to business districts.

But realizing that this may be inadequate, the author further proposes recreation, mental hygiene and "vital religious experience," aided by a widespread and constant educational program to keep the weak away from the demon.

The volume begins with the query as to why anyone should feel disposed to write another book about alcoholic beverages. It ends without having demonstrated why this one should have been written.

The University of Texas

Harry Estill Moore

Howard W. Odum: *American Sociology: The Story of Sociology in the United States through 1950*. (New York: Longman's Green & Co., 1951, Pp., 501, \$5.00.)

Howard W. Odum has written here a "live book". He is peculiarly fitted to chronicle the story of sociology for he has been one of its most enthusiastic promoters, has lived through much of its development, and has personally known many of the men of whom he writes. The year 1950 is a good benchmark for sociology, a half century from inconspicuous but promising beginnings to the "coming of age" in 1950. This story of American sociology is an inventory and appraisal and Odum does the job with fairmindedness and generosity, even of work towards which one suspects he lacks enthusiasm.

Those of us who live and work in the South are indebted to Odum. He has been the prime builder of the strong department of sociology in one of the leading universities of the South and the nation. Just as the development of sociology as a discipline has been, as Odum points out, one of the fertilizing factors in the development of other social sciences, so too has the growth of sociology at Carolina been a strong factor in the whole development of the social sciences in the South.

Part I of the *Story* deals with the background, in which the point is made that though there were significant European influences which Odum does not neglect, sociology in this country has been as "American as American literature, American culture, and the freedoms of the new world". Indeed one of the reasons for writing the *Story* was that it was "especially needed now by students and social scientists the world over, when in contrast to a past era in which America looked abroad for its sociological leadership, the world's expectations must now be found largely in American sociology".

Part II summarizes the contributions of the presidents of the American Sociological Society and is in many ways the most interesting part of the

book. Beginning with the big four—Ward, Sumner, Giddings, and Small—Odum carries the story through the last four up to 1950: Wirth, Frazier, Parsons, and Cottrell. The living presidents each were asked and for the most part answered such questions as the following: What influenced you to go into sociology? (inspiring teachers, interest in “social problems”). What are your principal contributions? What is the main concern of sociology? What are the main opportunities in sociological research, and the promise for the future? In the interests of these men can be seen some of the significant trends in sociology. The *Story* has pictures of all of them plus those of editors of various journals.

Part III presents summary accounts of the texts and scholarly works in various fields, including valuable reference lists, and gives the reader an appreciation of the scope of sociology. It begins with books in introductory and principles, history, theory, and methods. Then there are the special sociologies with the leading works in the fields again presented chronologically: social problems, community, rural, urban, and industrial sociology; family, marriage, and institutions; race and ethnic groups (excellent), and folk; population, demography, ecology, and regionalism.

Part IV tells the work of the regional societies (including our own Southwestern Sociological Society and its parent organization, the Southwestern Social Science Association), rural, and other groups, and the sociological journals. There are also accounts of the work of other leading sociologists missed in the record of the presidents and the text books, and workers “worthy of the background and coordinate service in American sociology” (Will W. Alexander, Walter Lippmann, *et al*).

Part V winds up with summary inventory and forecasts. Here Odum gives an appraisal of trends, criticisms (his implicit and explicit criticisms are too restrained) of current sociology, and restrained but optimistic predictions for the future. The sociologist will want this book in his workshop.

University of Arkansas

A. Stephen Stephan

C. E. Golding and Douglas King-Page: *Lloyd's*. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952, Pp., 220, \$4.50.)

John T. Walter: *Foreign Exchange Equilibrium*. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1951, Pp., 178, \$4.00.)

Lloyd's of London is probably the best known byword in the entire insurance field. There are few laymen who fail to realize the tremendous impact of this ancient institution; however, as with so many things whose origins go back to the long forgotten past, actual knowledge of the facts concerning Lloyd's and its operations is rare, indeed.

The new book by Golding and King-Page fills a definite need in a

superior manner and combines the factual, learned approach to its subject with an unusually high degree of readability. Lloyd's is a peculiar combination of tradition and hard-headed insurance practice which adds up to one of the most striking examples of the success of individual free enterprise in a field that has long been dominated by the giant corporation. The authors point out this characteristic of Lloyd's and show in detail how it happened. From 1690, when Lloyd's stood only for the name of a coffeehouse where people could do business in convenient surroundings, its history is sketched in its highlights up to this time. Even today, insurance business is done at Lloyd's, not by Lloyd's, and the underwriters still act as individuals and not as corporate employees. The repercussions of this system on the methods of doing business at Lloyd's is the heart of the discussion found in this book which is equally adapted to refresh the memory of the specialist or to introduce the educated layman to the fascinating story of Lloyd's of London.

The second work by John T. Walter on foreign exchange equilibrium was presented originally to the Graduate School of the University of Pittsburgh as a Ph.D. dissertation. The subject itself is one of the most widely discussed in the recent literature on foreign economic problems, partly because of its paramount importance and partly because of the lack of adequate solution. The present volume discusses, in scholarly fashion, the better known contributions to the subject of exchange equilibrium and analyzes their validity, using statistical comparisons furnished by exchange movements in the inter-war period. While the author contributes some comparisons not always found in this connection, he travels mostly over well-known ground. The writer demonstrates clearly his familiarity with the subject and with the many views advanced for discussion. His analysis, however, leads in substance only to the negative conclusion that existing theories on foreign exchange equilibrium are inadequate. It is at this point that major positive contributions could fill a keenly felt gap. In this respect, the book is a disappointment. To conclude, as the author does, that "trade should be adjusted to exchange rates, not the reverse" can hardly be called an exciting revelation or a very realistic approach to policy making. Professor Walter has given us an interesting summary of a much argued problem. He has not produced a better solution.

Oklahoma A. & M. College

Rudolph W. Trenton

George Rogers Taylor: *The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860*. (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1951, Pp., 490, \$4.50.)

This is Volume IV of the nine volume *Economic History of the United States* and describes the evolution and effects of transportation facilities in this country from 1815 to 1860. The book is amply supplied with

maps, charts, and illustrations, and includes an excellent classified bibliography.

In the opening chapters the author presents a well documented history of the development of turnpikes, canals, and railroads in America before the Civil War. This period brought changes in transportation that were truly revolutionary. For example, railroad mileage increased from 73 in 1830 to 30,636 in 1860. Another change was the amazing reduction in transportation rates. At the beginning of the period freight rates per ton-mile by wagon ranged from 30 to 70 cents. In 1860 the average railroad freight rate was 2.2 cents. Moreover, shipments by rail moved several times faster than the maximum speed possible by turnpike or canal.

In the second part of the book special attention is given to the influence of transportation on domestic and foreign commerce, shipping, manufacturing, labor, money and prices, and finance. The chapters describing the beginning of the factory system and the rise of the American labor movement are especially noteworthy. Throughout this entire section the author arrays convincing evidence in support of his claim that the efficiency of the transportation system was a basic determinant of the growth and health of the entire early American economy. He gives due credit to each stage in the evolution of transportation. In discussing the canals he points out that in spite of the financial tragedies involved, the canals rendered a useful and necessary service during the period preceding the railroad expansion. We may note also that he tends to minimize the economic effects of tariff legislation. He holds that the tariff question served chiefly as a political football, without having much significance in determining the actual course of industry and trade.

Professor Taylor deserves praise for writing a book that is comprehensive, scholarly, and readable. It should be welcomed by both economic historians and laymen.

Indiana University

James E. Moffat

Robert J. Havighurst and H. Gerthron Morgan: *The Social History of a War-Boom Community*. (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1951, Pp., 356, \$4.00.)

This volume is a social survey of the transitions that occurred in a small American town (Seneca, Illinois) during an industrial boom in World War II.

According to the authors' introduction, the work had a four-fold aim, namely, to study the adaptation of social institutions to rapid social change, to analyze the adaptation of persons to new conditions of life, to study the influence of a crisis upon the long-term history of a community, and to record one segment of American life during war-time. As such

the work is an excellent and unique study of the effects of a temporary war-boom upon a small community.

The authors' procedure was to record the observed social changes that took place. The project received the cooperation of government agencies and private industry, and the work is replete with recorded interviews that lend some illuminating insights into wartime civilian life. In addition, many statistical tables dealing with ship production, food-buying habits, and community data are utilized.

The work is organized into four main parts, the first of which describes the town of Seneca prior to the boom—its history and social structure, and its local shipyard, whose war-time activities are treated succinctly and graphically.

Part II is concerned with the personal and community adjustments that were occasioned by the sudden influx of workers—the consequent housing shortages, the relations between newcomers and “oldtimers,” and the effects of war-living upon children, consumers, and civilians generally.

Part III deals with the adjustment of institutions, describing the stresses and changes incurred by the town's churches, commerce, recreational facilities, schools, government, and welfare agencies.

Part IV summarizes the work in terms of the war's aftermath—Seneca in 1950, and the authors' evaluation of the boom transition. During the crucial years the community had contributed many ships to the war effort, but the boom experience left the town relatively unchanged.

The book is very readable, and, more important, represents another useful addition to the growing list of community case-studies that possess sociological value.

University of Helsinki

John E. Owen

Marshall E. Dimock: *Free Enterprise and the Administrative State*. (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1951, Pp., 179, \$2.50.)

The University of Alabama Press again makes available lectures given in the Southern Regional Training Program in Public Administration. *Free Enterprise and the Administrative State* represents a series delivered by Marshall E. Dimock in November 1950.

“Are we as Americans in danger of losing the free enterprise system? I believe we are,” says Dimock, “and the reason we are threatened with the loss of this system is not the one which is popularly emphasized . . . It is not the collectivist-minded bureaucrats in Washington who are chiefly responsible for what is happening . . . The principal reason the free enterprise system is being altered almost beyond recognition is that businessmen themselves and their organizations that propagandize most

in favor of free enterprise are usually the ones who unwittingly are undermining it." Free enterprise, he explains, "Consists of such things as individual ownership, rigorous competition, and freedom of management." This system which has meant so much to the development of America is likely to disappear because of the feeling on the part of both the socialists and business management that business is destined to consolidate into a few large combinations. Dimock denies the inevitability of this trend. He insists that competition in many areas must be maintained and individual ownership assured to a large block of our population. His view is strengthened by observation of "free enterprise at its best" in Vermont. To this system he attributes the Vermonter's strong sense of individual, family and community responsibility.

The greatest drive for concentration of power in either business or government, he claims, is the desire for security, but this quest is a mere will-o-the-wisp. The greatest security is possible only by a "better understanding of the free enterprise system and of its interrelatedness with popularly controlled government . . . It entails a widespread ownership of private property and of the means of obtaining a living by one's own efforts . . . The common ingredient in free enterprise is a shared power . . . Concentrated power, whether political, economical or ecclesiastical, is not compatible with free institutions." In terms of human ends free enterprise is more efficient and it is only in these terms that efficiency should be measured.

Free Enterprise and the Administrative State joins those volumes by Seymour Harris and others in an attempt to refute John T. Flynn's arguments advanced in *The Road Ahead*. As in the case of Harris, Dimock emphasizes the causal factors of collectivism and denies that the final outcome depends on a war of conflicting ideologies. He clings to the system of representative institutions as the device for the prevention of totalitarianism. Free enterprise will be preserved if made vital and if the people want it. The people possess the tools for its preservation, says Dimock, the political scientist.

Boston University

Lashley G. Harvey

Fred Witney: *Government and Collective Bargaining*. (Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1951, Pp., 741, N.P.)

Professor Witney has written an unusually interesting book of generally high quality, yet it is weakened in many places by incompleteness and strong bias. According to the author's preface, "This book is intended primarily for the use of students in liberal arts and business school curriculums."

First, let us look at some of the book's good points. Its sectional headings thoroughly cover the subject of *Government and Collective Bargaining* all the way from antitrust laws to wage stabilization at the be-

ginning of the Korean crisis in 1950. Several chapters, such as the one on recent Supreme Court decisions on labor injunctions, are among the best material yet published on the subject. Each chapter is well authenticated with many basic references, which together show that much research and effort went into the book. The use of argument and viewpoint in the book makes it refreshing and interesting to read, although these virtues are offset by long paragraphs, small type, repetition of ideas, and no use of illustrations or tables.

The strength of the book is that it will help mature a student's understanding of collective bargaining problems by presenting the socioeconomic backgrounds and attitudes which led to each governmental action in collective bargaining. Yet this advantage also contributes to the book's primary weakness—a lack of balance in viewpoint. The author apparently tries to present various sides of problems, but his own attitudes seem to be so strong that he overlooks many counter-arguments. At one point, concerning a Supreme Court decision on the political contributions restriction in the Taft-Hartley Act, the author throws in the "towel" with, "How the majority of the Supreme Court denied that this is the purpose of the legislation is beyond human understanding."

Mr. Witney likes practically nothing about the Taft-Hartley law, and he proceeds to say so in about half the book. His argument is based upon the fundamental principle of *laissez faire*; i.e., let's require collective bargaining, but let's not regulate it. Accordingly, the author approves the Constitutional protection of free speech in union picketing, but he disapproves employer free speech because it discourages unionism! He favors democratic elections to establish unions in a bargaining unit, but he opposes democratic decertification elections because they discourage unionism. The book is full of this kind of reasoning, and those of us who might oppose it are given no quarter by such statements as, "People who support this point of view either are completely ignorant . . . or else would deceive the public . . ." or "Nothing could be further from the truth." Now we know what he thinks of some of us!

With regard to coverage, the extensive bibliography includes practically no references to management literature written either by active managers or students of management, and this lack is reflected in the text. For example, he says that management prefers departmental seniority in lieu of plant-wide seniority, because the former gives management more control of the labor force; but he overlooks the problems of more transfers, extra training, and loss of productivity often involved in plant-wide seniority. The reader experienced in labor relations soon recognizes that Professor Witney often has not given equally both sides of a controversy. He severely criticizes the judiciary for unduly using the courts to implement their social and economic philosophy. We might ask if he is not doing the same thing with a textbook.

On the basis of the comments above, this reviewer questions the appropriateness of *Government and Collective Bargaining* for the typical undergraduate class; but the book should be excellent supplementary reading for many classes and for instructors with some collective bargaining background, because of its thorough treatment of the thinking behind certain viewpoints.

The University of Texas

Keith Davis

Hans Julius Wolff: *Roman Law*. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951, Pp., 260, \$3.75.)

This introductory text is addressed to the "practical lawyer" in an attempt to acquaint those interested with a general historical prospectus of Roman Law. The period actually covered is from the Twelve Tables through Justinian, with a further tracing through the medieval to the modern period. As a condensation of a wealth of material, the text serves its purpose well.

It is difficult to stress omissions since the author expressly excludes the substance of the law. It is equally difficult to condemn the inclusion of references to political and economic institutions. However, inclusion of such material is coupled with not informing the practical lawyer of the fundamental distinctions which makes the Roman law a different legal system. That specific performance is an ordinary remedy while money damages is an extraordinary remedy is a principle reversed by the Common law. The principles of Roman law and reasoning from them begin with statutory material, whereas the common law judicial decision contains the fundamentals of our system. That Common Law lawyers reason from judicial decision interpreting the facts as they require a remedy rather than from a code which affords a remedy is unmentioned. To a "practical lawyer" these are important elements of the Roman law.

The stress upon political and economic institutions which is found in this text commends it to the political scientist but leaves the student of the law informed but untaught. The author seems to commend as extraordinary any change in the law to meet current economic changes and to severely condemn as unprogressive, or "reactionary," any lack of change. Clearly the author has selected and arranged his material according to a generalization of the entire history of Rome, rather than by penetrating the guiding principles of a component of Roman history. This institutional approach ignores the basic idea of the law as an element of justice or social control and seeks to show the law as a reflection of economic and political changes, a law devoid of purpose other than the particular reform required by the social planners of the day. The brief summaries of current philosophic interpretations of Roman law near the close of the text seem incongruous against the background of an historical clash of classes.

In spite of objections, the text fills a long standing need for an introduction to a difficult, complex and specialized history.

Houston, Texas

James N. Adams

Lowell Juilliard Carr and James Edson Stermer: *Willow Run*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952, Pp., 406, \$5.00.)

It is intriguing—this endeavor to paint a creditable picture of such a book.

The chapters of and about the people who worked at Ford's great bomber plant during the war, are so filled with charts, tables, figures and pictures—nearly all of which are of significance to the inquiring mind—that, were it not for an exceptional portrayal of the human element, the casual reader would probably not read through Part One. Thus: the reply of an Italian-born mother, "One goes where there is bread," might well explain the shifting during wartime of seventeen million other Americans; the pettishness and complacency of people under chaotic conditions is casually noted with "In a community developing à la Robinson Crusoe or Herbert Spencer low morale gets built in as inevitably as red-heads get freckles—you get along or else"; and regimentation in the Bomber Plant revealed by—"Three foremen who spent ten minutes bemoaning poor workmanship and three minutes setting it right." A typist saying "There's a certain irony in factory work. I typed a quit-slip recently. It read (Reason for discharge—caught sitting on toilet with his pants up.) That's it! In some twisted kind of way that puts into words for me the whole d . . . industrial picture. Caught with his pants up! Outside a factory people try not to get caught with their pants down. But there it's up! See what I mean?"

Industrial-social problems found to exist are bluntly listed—and occasionally with a 'reason for' the problem given as, "The thing so painfully lacking is a specific overall pattern of when and how!" and, "The utter disregard of the *necessary relations* which exist in America between a factory and its servicing community."

The feeling of frustration and almost of disgust at the senseless mistakes made by those in places of responsibility, and which grows upon the reader as the story ends, is fortunately alleviated, if not dispelled, by this thought-provoking paragraph: "Nobody deliberately and openly opposed the war effort. Not at all. Not ever. All they did, all anybody ever did was merely to fight every impact of the war effort that threatened their own precious little areas of security—and to keep their own little local ways of life unchanged."

Baylor University

Hugh O. Davis

Philip Selznick: *The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics*. (New York: McGraw Hill Co., 1952, Pp., 350, \$5.00.)

Mario Einaudi, Jean-Marie Domenach and Aldo Garosci: *Communism in Western Europe*. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1951, Pp., 239, \$3.00.)

Wilson Record: *The Negro and the Communist Party*. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1951, Pp., 340, \$3.50.)

Professor Selznick of the Department of Sociology of the University of California at Los Angeles has produced under the auspices of the Rand Corporation a thoroughly sound analysis of the strategy and tactics of modern Communism. In brief, his book is an analysis of the Communist Party in terms of its organization and the ends and goals it seeks to attain through organizational activity. Written without passion and from a factual and analytical point of view, the book is of great value in conveying an understanding and appreciation of the flexibility, strength and weaknesses of the Communist Party structure. Of special value is the description of the use made by the Communists of "front" organizations and of penetration into non-Communist groups. The tactic of placing key personnel in organizations, not for the purpose of directly capturing them but of neutralizing them as sources of anti-Communist propaganda (i.e., the movie industry), has not been adequately stressed by previous writers. The book commends itself to students of Communism and represents the best product so far of the Rand Research Corporation. The author demonstrates a mastery of the classic Communist writings as well as of the contemporary structure and activity of Communist parties.

Communism in Western Europe contains three essays, the first by Mario Einaudi on Communism in Western Europe, the second by Jean-Marie Domenach on the French Communist Party, and the third by Aldo Garosci on the Italian situation. The first essay is a compact summary of the history of the rise of Communism in France and Italy, concluding with the thesis that the defeat of Communism in Western Europe is dependent upon the maintenance of a "situation of strength" supported by the United States plus the removal of the basis of Communist appeal by the solution of the internal political and economic problems of France and Italy. The second essay, on the Communists in France, is the most original of the group. In addition to describing the organization and basis of the French party, the author stresses its position as the inheritor of the "radical" tradition in French politics. Although the movement would thus seem to make its popular appeal on a traditional French basis, even inclining to a support of French nationalism, one is not to conclude from this that there is any danger of the development of a Titoist deviation in France. The party remains under the firm control

of a core of militants who, although they may tactically capitalize on existing emotional and ideological tendencies of the French peasant and worker, have no intention of breaking with Moscow. The essay on the Italian Communist Party stresses the importance of the party as an obstacle to the development of a democratic program and as a group capable and willing to avail itself of the economic difficulties of Italy as means of sabotaging the development of stable and moderate government. More so than in France, where the traditions of political activity are older and more deeply rooted, the Italian Communists emerge as agents of obstruction and confusion. It will be interesting to observe the reaction of the Italian party to the resurgent fascist movement and to see whether the same mistakes will be made in regard to it as were made by the German Communists during the rise of Hitler. The book as a unit is both informative and convenient and can be used in a sense as a case study for the application of Professor Selznick's analysis of communist organization.

Professor Record's book is different in scope from the two discussed above. In it he has produced a detailed study of the relation of the Communist party to the American negro from 1919 to the present. The author untangles and analyzes the shifting party line and the multifarious organizations created for tactical purposes and then often abandoned as soon as they had served their purpose. The picture which emerges is again one of cynical opportunism on the part of the Communists. Of special note is the alternating strategy of the Party in regard to the national question and the negro, the employment of negroes in the party structure as window dressing, the collaboration in "United Fronts," and the ruthless exploitation of negro intellectuals. The work is well documented and the author has earned the appreciation of his colleagues for the diligence with which he has ploughed through a mass of detailed and tortuous material to present a straightforward and comprehensive analysis.

All these books are indicative of the improved standard of objective and scientific analysis which is replacing the old emotional approach to the Communist problem. They are thus evidence of a developing maturity of outlook and sense of realism which has frequently been lacking in the past literature on the subject.

The University of Texas

H. Malcolm Macdonald

Clyde M. Campbell (Ed.): *Practical Applications of Democratic Administration*. (New York: Harper & Bros., 1952, Pp., 318, \$3.00.)

Many recent books on democratic administration and supervision have tended to emphasize process to the neglect of the basic beliefs, values, and attitudes essential to the ultimate effectiveness of the process. This book makes it clear that *Democracy* embodies two different but interacting meanings: (1) sociocentric beliefs and values of the individuals within a

group; and (2) the process by which a group attempts to accomplish common objectives. In Chapter IV, Rokeach leans heavily upon research findings in characterizing authoritarian and democratic personalities, and in pointing out some of the determinants of each. The chapters in Part Two illustrate the manner in which democratic values and democratic processes interact in social situations.

Campbell, the editor of this very timely volume, says its purpose is threefold: "first, to help administrators and prospective administrators see the significant role that education plays in the furtherance of desirable human relationships; second, to give added meanings and new interpretations to the concept of educational leadership in a free society; third, to describe possible ways of putting educational programs into action in public-school settings." The book is composed of Part One, containing four chapters "which present basic educational, psychological, sociological, anthropological principles, considerations, and interpretations;" Part Two, consisting of seven chapters "which present seven different treatments of applied educational leadership. Each of these chapters has its reference point in an actual community situation;" and Part Three, consisting of two chapters which deal with the "professional education of school administrators and with probable future trends in the field of democratic administration."

The reviewer believes that this book is both timely and significant in that the authors have combined their efforts to define carefully the nature of democratic leadership and to illustrate convincingly how democratic leadership in education can operate effectively.

The University of Texas

Roy M. Hall

Seth, Shepard McKay: *Texas Politics, 1906-1944*. (Lubbock: Texas Tech Press, 1952, Pp., 486, \$5.00.)

Previous publications of S. S. McKay, including *W. Lee O'Daniel and Texas Politics 1938-1942*, have been noted for their skillful objectivity and the abundance of information. *Texas Politics, 1906-1944* keeps up the high standards. Anyone who seriously contemplates an understanding of the current political confusion in Texas cannot afford to overlook this carefully documented study, which begins the year the new primary system provided by the Terrell Election Law became operative. The new records of county votes made it possible for McKay to give special attention to the voting patterns in ten counties east, west and south of Austin having large percentages of population of German extraction.

The author found that an earlier preference for the Republican party tended to persist in national elections, while more of the voters tended to part company with the Democratic candidates who embraced prohibition. The author has been careful to avoid claiming that the ten "German counties" swung elections with two qualified exceptions. In

the Special Senatorial Election of 1941, in which O'Daniel nosed out Lyndon Johnson, McKay concluded that "the Texas citizens of German descent were justified in feeling that they had elected a Senator." The study of the Mrs. James Ferguson-Ross Sterling race in 1932 indicated a statewide vote of 477,644 to 473,846, with the German counties voting 20,121 to 9,796, and McKay wrote: "It may be said that those counties elected a governor in 1932, since the Ferguson majority in the ten counties was almost three times the size of their lead in the state as a whole." The author's understanding of the broader, statewide voting habits stands him in good stead and he avoids many of the pitfalls of the limited area or language or racial group studies. In fact, the study broadens to become state and at times national in scope.

The careful summaries of the programs or platforms of individual candidates for state and national offices make the book the best available supplement to Ernest Winkler's *Platforms of Political Parties in Texas* which stopped in 1916. *Texas Politics* is a gold mine of political facts, vote tabulations and thoughtful analyses based upon long study. Unfortunately, V. O. Key, when he wrote his chapter "Texas: A Politics of Economics," which appeared in his *Southern Politics* (1949), was unable to benefit from McKay's long range as compared with his own short range viewpoint. For example, Key might not have written: "In Texas the vague outlines of a politics are emerging in which irrelevances are pushed into the background and people divide broadly along liberal and conservative lines. A modified class politics seems to be evolving . . ."

The final chapter on "The Texas Regulars Movement" should be read in conjunction with the report of the Committee of Political Parties of the American Political Science Association entitled *Toward a More Responsible Two Party System* (1950). If foreign policy, for example, suffers, the blame may more correctly be placed upon the national party leaders and their executive committees who meddle in local matters or try to override efforts to uphold the principle of popular sovereignty. The remedy suggested by the Committee that there be more authority in the national headquarters of the national parties may have boomeranged in Texas by flying in the face of Texas trends in 1952.

The University of Texas

Robert C. Cotner

J. S. Slotkin: *Personality Development*. (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1952, Pp., 401, \$4.50.)

The contents of this book are based upon extensive research. The conclusions made by the author are supported by many ideas and facts resulting from that research. Both the conclusions and much of the supporting data or findings are included in the body of the text. In fact, the book can be thought of as one of numerous quotations of important conclusions of others or of opinions of important leaders in the

field at various stages in history and of generalizations that emerge from those statements.

There is represented here a thorough piece of historic research. It may represent the most extensive of any in the area of personality development in the early years of life. The findings do not purport to carry the reader very far in individual development yet they give him a fund of information that serves to evaluate the significance of personality development during the first five years of life.

The book is divided into four parts, and each part is devoted to a significant area of personality development. Part One concerns itself with *Inheritance*, and includes the well accepted interpretations of this phase of child development; part two evolves a concept of *Socialization*; part three embraces many points of view on *Culturization*, including supporting data from other lands and peoples; and part four presents an interpretation of *Individuation*. Although the author's own words occupy very little space in the book, they integrate the ideas and become the significant aspect of the text.

The conclusions are readily acceptable to this reviewer. It is easy to agree with the supporting arguments as well as with the statements given. Clear and concise sentences are used to clarify points made. For example, the author explains the differentiation between socialized traits and cultures succinctly as follows: "Throughout this work I am differentiating between society and culture. On this basis, socialized traits occur in all societies, irrespective of their cultures." Another instance in which clarity of expression of ideas is revealed is in the interpretation of the mechanisms of adjustment. Here, for example, the author presents a diagrammatic interpretation of the inter-relationships existing between projection and introjection.

This book can be read with satisfaction and profit by students of personality development during the early years of an individual's life.
Brooklyn College

Lester D. Crow

Thomas R. Amlie: *Let's Look at the Record*. (Capital City Press, Madison, Wis., 1951, Pp., 612, \$10.00.)

Let's Look at the Record by former Representative Thomas R. Amlie of Wisconsin represents the product of deep conviction and the expenditure of a prodigious amount of labor and energy. It is an attempt at analysis of the record votes within the chambers of the national Congress for the period between 1930-1950. This has been done with a view to determine the liberal or conservative attitudes expressed and reflected by such votes, and to evaluate American political trends in terms of this analysis.

As has been indicated, a vast amount of raw data has been accumulated; it is presented in two chief forms. Approximately the first half of the

book is devoted to a review of the legislative history of a goodly number of congressional measures in terms of the various roll calls occurring thereon during the various stages of the legislative process. The latter portion of the work presents a man by man analysis of record votes for contemporary 1950 members only, plus the senatorial votes of Messrs. Truman and Barkley.

This roll call analysis is not done on a solely partisan basis of Democrats and Republicans; it is basically a matter of *plus* or *minus* ratings in terms of the liberal or conservative characteristics of the issue at stake in each vote. Here the reader is completely at the mercy of Mr. Amlie's viewpoint as to what constitutes the liberal or conservative aspect of each vote; this dichotomy admits no variation.

Herein lies a strength and a weakness of this work. There is no preaching upon the matter of dispassion, nor is lip service paid to any monumental cant as to impartiality on the part of the author. The bias is overt, incisive, and consistent. This patent avowal of a controversial viewpoint throughout the presentation does tend to weaken the total impact of the book; with what the towel is wetted is known before it smacks at intellectual bare skin.

Mechanically the book is barely adequate. Proof reading has been sloppily done within the text portion, and if the same unfortunate slovenliness is maintained within the calendar of individual members' votes, there would be serious question as to the degree of faith which could be shown this otherwise useful and valuable information. In addition Amlie blinks his eyes at times in order to hold to a consistent line. Republicans apparently can never conscientiously vote liberal, hence although numerology aids them in connection with their votes on civil rights measures, they really are not what Amlie's own dichotomy makes them. Besides New York Democrats take long weekends, and thus have accumulated pairs or absences on many measures. These latter data are hinted at, but missing are they from the analysis of the member's record. Surely an attempt to complete a full scale, accurately executed study of the proportions attempted by Amlie would require that these shortcomings of supposedly backbone liberals be set forth so that their constituents could measure their attendance defections also in terms of absence from roll calls.

Despite these limitations, Mr. Amlie is to be congratulated upon his willingness to undergo great labor, much of it necessarily painful and extremely slow, in giving to us this analysis contained in *Let's Look at the Record*.

Wayne University

Charles W. Shull

Malcolm B. Parsons: *The Use of the Licensing Power by the City of Chicago*. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952, Pp., 198, \$4.50.)

Local authorities are today caught in the grip of immediate and urgent problems concerned mainly with finance. Paramount to any solution of these problems is the understanding of the conditions under which local government operates. Professor Parsons' stated intent in this book is to acquaint the reader with the conditions under which Illinois municipal governments function, with special reference to the licensing power of the City of Chicago. The author has taken what could easily have been a dry recitation of facts, cases and statutes, and turned it into a readable, well organized and interesting story of administrative and political problems in governing America's second largest city. The reader cannot help but be amazed at great metropolitan Chicago whose political machines have made presidents, yet itself remains politically subservient in its own affairs to the down-state rural sentiments, and is denied home rule powers to solve its own unique problems.

The impressions obtained from reading this book will be varied, random and confused. Yet, they will probably be no more varied, random and confused than the actual conditions the author portrays. One of the first impressions is the narrow interpretations given to the legislative grants of licensing power by the Illinois courts, but toward the end this impression will be modified in that the courts are apparently more lenient where the license charge is connected in some manner with a *fee theory*. The reader will probably not be able to reconcile why the courts have held the YMCA in its food establishments was not subject to the restaurant license ordinance as these establishments were a service to its members, yet the Disciples of Father Divine maintaining a food establishment for their members were penalized for violating the ordinance. When in the concluding chapters it is seen that approximately 19 per cent of the total general revenue of the City of Chicago is derived from its licensing activities it begins to appear that the City has well used its *limited* powers.

In presenting his case Professor Parsons raises many provocative questions ranging from why the modern urban community produces so many moral misfits and social deviates to the absence of party systems which can present clear choices between alternative sets of values. The reader's imagination is stimulated to carry many of these questions further as to the possibilities if additional home rule privileges were to be granted by the Illinois Legislature. What would be the result of an extension of the licensing power to all trades and professions (as the City would apparently like) on the mobility of professions and labor; or on economic political pressure groups as they press for a favored position over out-of-city competitors?

Spinning on an axis of the regulatory and financial needs of the metropolitan city the spokes of this study reach out to encompass the political, sociological, and economic problems of complicated urban government.
The University of Texas T. E. McMillan, Jr.

Curtis D. MacDougall: *Understanding Public Opinion; A Guide for Newspapermen and Newspaper Readers*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1952, Pp., 698, \$5.00.)

Public opinion as a subject is variously taught in American colleges under the auspices of departments of journalism, political science, psychology, and sociology. It would be a fortunate author—and publisher—who could contrive a book substantially acceptable to teachers and students in all these disciplines. Specialized approaches and academic competition militate against commercially successful consolidation of efforts. Dr. MacDougall, professor of journalism at Northwestern University, has written with primary appeal for his own field. At the same time he has gathered a wealth of informative materials of value and interest to sociologists and, to a lesser extent, to political scientists.

Of three major sections, the first—and shortest—is devoted to definitions and fundamental principles about the nature of public opinion, man, society, and propaganda. The second consists of essays on American culture, its nature, legends, folklore, myths, taboos, superstitions, prejudices, and fashions. The last—and longest—deals with conventional opinion media: leadership, language, the arts, religion, education, professional (including governmental) propagandists, and journalism.

This book is eminently readable. It is well organized within its scope, well equipped with descriptive headings, and often courageously liberal in point of view. Pictures, diagrams, and other visual possibilities are not employed. Sparingly footnoted, Dr. MacDougall's book is nevertheless representative of much of the best literature on public opinion. It is a contribution to teaching materials rather than an addition to research data, a summary for the layman or beginner but not a treatise for the advanced student.

University of Maryland

Franklin L. Burdette

Richard Goode: *The Corporation Income Tax*. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1951, Pp., 242, \$3.00.)

Professor Goode has done a commendable job with a difficult subject. The prevailing theme of his book is that the present corporation income tax is a good tax and should be continued as an integral part of our revenue structure. He uses both price theory and national income theory as tools of analysis; however, the bulk of his discussion is built around the latter.

The best sections of the book are concerned with the effects of the corporation income tax on savings, investment, and consumption; hence, on national income and employment. Considerable use is made of statistical data in his attempts to measure and estimate the effects, but the data is well integrated into his theoretical reasoning. Goode concludes that savings and investment will be more adversely affected, whereas consumption will be less adversely affected by the corporation income tax than by other major taxes. The comparative impacts of the corporation income tax and the other major taxes are thus somewhat in doubt but should not be markedly different. He believes that the corporation income tax is compatible with a high level of national income and employment.

It seems to the reviewer that price theory is used altogether too sparingly. It is used to show that, with certain exceptions, the short run effects of the corporation income tax on product prices and wage rates will be nil, given the level of aggregate demand and the level of government spending. The exceptions occur (1) when monopoly price is below full monopoly price and (2) in the case of public utility rates. Goode concentrates mainly on the effects of the tax on the *level* of income and employment. Price theory could have been used to advantage to show its effects on economic efficiency, or resource allocation—which is of some importance in economic theory, too.

Goode's defense of the corporation income tax is built around three points. One is his conclusion that it is compatible with a high level of income and employment. Another is that diversity in the tax structure is desirable. The third is based on the legal view that a corporation and its stockholders are separate entities. He cites separation of ownership and control in giant "public" corporations as being "economic" evidence that the legal view is sound. His arguments will probably gain little ground against anti-corporation income tax economists.

Some side points of the book are worthy of note. The author gives concise but enlightening discussions of depreciation allowances, inventory valuation, and integration of corporation and personal income taxes. Most economists will find that time spent in reading this book is well spent.

Oklahoma A. & M. College

Richard H. Leftwich

Adolph Watz et al: *Cost Accounting*. (Dallas: South-western Publishing Company, 1952, Pp., 800, N.P.)

Since this review comes from the hand of an economist rather than an accountant, no searching attempt is made to evaluate the validity of the accounting principles developed, but the reputation of the authors speaks well for the competency of their work. Basically their book is a mod-

ern and complete presentation of Cost Accounting as a tool of management.

Replete with illustrations, questions, problems, and supplemented by two practice sets and an instructor's manual, this book promises to be a highly teachable text for either one or two semesters.

An outstanding feature is the emphasis upon cost finding and cost analysis as a basis for managerial decisions. Break-even points, differential costs, and profit-volume become tools with which the accountant services top management. The treatment of budgeting in relation to standard costs is excellent.

One great strength, not emphasized *per se* by the authors, but definitely a conditioning factor in their writing, is that the quantitative analysis and explanation is made in a context properly recognizing the wider import of qualitative judgments. Too often, in the opinion of some, the accountant is mechanically correct but lacking in a broader vision of a qualitative context which gives meaning and purpose to his work. Such a deficiency is not to be found in this text.

University of Houston

Sam Wesley Davis

Other Books Received

Anderson, Ronald A.; Pomeroy, Dwight A.; and Kumpf, Walter A.: *Business Law* (Fourth edition.) (Cincinnati: South-Western Publishing Company, 1952, Pp., 964, NP.)

The Anglo-Jewish Association: *Germany's New Nazis*. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, Pp., 76, \$2.75.)

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News Notes

Texas A. & M. College served as host for the national Research Marketing Workshop, July 11-19. A total of 120 participants representing 35 states attended the conference. A. & M. staff members who were active in planning and directing the Workshop included L. P. Gabbard, W. E. Paulson, Warren LeBourveau, J. G. McNeely, R. B. Halpin, Harold Sorensen, J. R. Motheral, M. C. Jaynes, William H. Burns, Tyrus R. Timm and Experiment Station Director R. D. Lewis.

A cooperative study of the retirement plans and methods used by Texas farmers for attaining economic security has been initiated by the Department of Agricultural Economics and Sociology, Texas A. & M. College. Cooperators are the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and the Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance of the Social Security Administration. Project leaders are Dr. Louis J. Ducoff of the BAE and Dr. Joe R. Motheral of A. & M. College.

The department of sociology and anthropology, University of Kansas, and the Department of Human Relations, will collaborate with Community Studies, Inc., in a study of factors affecting conditions of employment of minority group members in the Kansas City metropolitan area.

Dr. Carlyle S. Smith, assistant professor of anthropology, University of Kansas, conducted a field party engaged in archeological excavations in South Dakota during the past summer.

Dr. Melville Dalton has resigned as assistant professor of human relations and sociology, University of Kansas, to accept a similar position at Washington University, St. Louis.

Merlin G. Cox, of Troy State Teachers College (Alabama) has been appointed assistant professor of history at the University of Wichita.

Edward Cannan has returned to the department of history, The University of Texas, following a year of study in ancient history while in Italy under a Fullbright grant. Dr. Oliver Radkey, in the field of Russian history, will also be back on the staff, after a year's leave at the University of Cincinnati. Dr. Archibald Lewis will begin his new duties in the same department this September, after a year in Europe. Dr. Fulmer Mood, also of the same department, has been granted a year's leave on account of health. Dr. William Braisted has received a Ford Foundation grant for study in Japanese language and history at Harvard

this year. Dr. John H. Hill, who taught in the department in the field of medieval history last year, returns to Texas A. & M. College this fall. Research activities of members of the department of history include the following: a two-volume readings book in American History, by R. L. Biesele and R. C. Cotner (with John Ezell and Gilbert Fite, of the University of Oklahoma), published this summer by Houghton Mifflin; Dr. Walter P. Webb's newest book on world frontiers, to be released by Houghton Mifflin this fall; Dr. Bailey Carroll's study of the Texas Santa Fe Trail, published by the Panhandle Plains Historical Association; and a study underway by Professor Lewis Hanke, Director for Latin American Studies, on the life, ideas, and controversies of Bartolome de Las Casas, 1474-1566, which will include an annotated list of all important known printed and manuscript material by and about Las Casas during the last four centuries.

James H. Melancon, Research Associate in the Department of Agricultural Economics at the Louisiana State University has resigned to accept a position with the Cotton Branch of PMA. He is now located at Little Rock, Arkansas. Thomas A. Sylvest has accepted the position formerly occupied by Mr. Melancon. Haskell L. Seal, Research Associate in the Department of Agricultural Economics at L.S.U., has accepted a position with the National Cash Register Company. He will continue to live in Baton Rouge.

The forty-fourth annual Governors' Conference was held in Houston, Texas, June 29-July 2. David W. Knepper, Professor of Government and Public Administration, University of Houston, attended most of its sessions and has prepared the following condensed report: Although following the usual pattern of these conferences, significant developments occurred. These included: *first*, extremely serious discussion of taxation and fiscal problems with special concern regarding federal-state and state-local relations. This resulted in a resolution directing the Council of State Governments to prepare detailed information as a basis for requesting the national government to vacate certain fields of taxation and return full responsibility for certain activities (highways, education) to the states; *second*, the study of toll road experience and the launching of tentative plans for a Texas Gulf to St. Louis road under sponsorship of the states concerned. National politics occupied a great deal of unscheduled time with many incidents later reflected in gubernatorial conduct at the national conventions. Most notable in this area was the quiet but thorough groundwork negotiation of New York's Dewey and the famous "fair play" telegram of the twenty-seven Republican Governors.